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Spatialmemory refers to the part of thememory system that encodes, stores, recognizes and recalls spatial
information about the environment and the agent’s orientation within it. Such information is required to
be able to navigate to goal locations, and is vitally important for any embodied agent, or model thereof,
for reaching goals in a spatially extended environment.
In this paper, a number of computationally implemented cognitive models of spatial memory are re-
viewed and compared. Three categories ofmodels are considered: symbolicmodels, neural networkmod-
els, and models that are part of a systems-level cognitive architecture. Representative models from each
category are described and compared in a number of dimensions alongwhich simulationmodels can differ
(level of modeling, types of representation, structural accuracy, generality and abstraction, environment
complexity), including their possible mapping to the underlying neural substrate.
Neural mappings are rarely explicated in the context of behaviorally validated models, but they could
be useful to cognitive modeling research by providing a new approach for investigating a model’s plau-
sibility. Finally, suggested experimental neuroscience methods are described for verifying the biological
plausibility of computational cognitive models of spatial memory, and open questions for the field of spa-
tial memory modeling are outlined.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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A wealth of neurophysiological results from human and animal
experiments have, in recent years, helped shed light on the mech-
anisms and brain structures underlying spatial memory. Although
it is possible to investigate spatial cognition purely from the point
of view of one of the cognitive sciences, interdisciplinary analy-
ses at the level of behavior as well as underlying neural mecha-
nisms provide a more solid foundation and more evidence. Within
the broader scope of cognitive sciences involved in investigating
memory systems, such as psychology and neuroscience, computa-
tional models play a unique and important role in helping to in-
tegrate findings from different disciplines, as well as generating,
defining, formalizing, and testing, and generating hypotheses, and
thus helping to guide research in cognitive science.
There are multiple relevant reviews concerning the psychology
of spatial cognition (Allen, 2003; Tommasi & Laeng, 2012) as well
as its underlying neuroscience (Avraamides & Kelly, 2008; Burgess,
2008; Moser, Kropff, &Moser, 2008; Tommasi, Chiandetti, Pecchia,
Sovrano, &Vallortigara, 2012). Although someof these reviews also
mention the occasional computational model, no systematic re-
view of computational models of spatial memory has been pub-
lished in the last decade (note that Trullier, Wiener, Berthoz, &
Meyer, 1997 have reviewed biologically based artificial navigation
systems, andMark, Freksa, Hirtle, Lloyd, & Tversky, 1999 published
a review of models of geographical space). The main contributions
of the current paper lie in providing a reviewof computational cog-
nitivemodels of spatialmemory (taking into account implemented
models of cognition across disciplines, including psychology, neu-
roscience, andAI); providing a comparison of thesemodels; report-
ing possible underlying neural correlates corresponding to parts of
these models to aid comparison and verification; and finally out-
lining open questions relevant to this field which have not been
fully addressed yet.
1.1. Spatial memory and representations
Biological agents such as mammals, as well as embodied au-
tonomous agents, exist within spatially extended environments.
Given that these environments contain objects relevant to the
agent’s survival, such as nutrients or other agents, they need to take
the positions of these objects into account. The purpose of spatial
memory is to encode, store, recognize and recall spatial informa-
tion about the environment, and the objects and agents within it.
Spatial representations can be categorized based on the refer-
ence frame used. Egocentric representations represent spatial in-
formation relative to the agent’s body or body parts. In contrast,
allocentric representations represent spatial information relative
to environmental landmarks or boundaries, independent of their
relation to the agent. We will return to these types of representa-
tions, and the way they are encoded in mammalian brains, in Sec-
tion 2.
In addition to navigation space – the space of potential travel –
other forms of spatial representation have also been considered inthe literature (e.g. representations of the positions of body parts
or external representations such as maps or diagrams—Tversky,
2005).
In this review, we will focus on representations of navigation
space and the space around the body, because the largest num-
ber of computational cognitive models account for them, and also
because they are the most ubiquitous and generalizable represen-
tations. Whereas information concerning the space of the body
strongly depends on the specific form of embodiment (such as
body size and shape), and the use of external spatial represen-
tations is exclusive to humans, the types of representations and
strategies required for navigation space are similar for different
kinds of bodies and agents.
1.2. Relevance of computational cognitive models to spatial memory
research
Computational models attempt to formally describe a part (or
parts) of cognition in a simplified fashion, allowing their simula-
tion on computers (McClelland, 2009; Sun, 2008b), and providing
more detail, precision, and possibly more clarity than qualitative
descriptions. In addition, computational models might facilitate
the understanding and clarification of the implications of a theory
or idea, in ways that would be difficult for humans without sim-
ulation on computers (McClelland, 2009). Since spatial memory is
an interdisciplinary research area (drawing on at least psychology,
neuroscience, and artificial intelligence), involving multiple repre-
sentations and processes, it is especially important to formulate
theories precisely, using a common language. Computationalmod-
els can provide such a common ground.
The development of computational cognitive models also re-
quires making a large number of design decisions, possibly lead-
ing to novel hypotheses, which can then be evaluated. This process
usually constitutes an ongoing cycle of development, testing, and
revision. Critically, most of this is performed on a computer and
thus can be quick and efficient.
This efficiency is especially important for modeling mecha-
nisms with representations that are not easily explicated or mea-
sured directly, such as in the case of spatial cognition. Humans
cannot easily report the structure of their spatial representations
and the mechanisms operating on them. There are a large num-
ber of structures and mechanisms that could partially account for
spatial skills (e.g. navigation), and a time-efficient way of defining
them, and investigating their implications in an automated fashion
is important to facilitate the evaluation of their plausibility.
Once a theory or hypothesis has been encoded computationally,
generating predictions from it is a straightforward matter of
providing model parameters and input data, and running the
model on a computer. This is usually more efficient than obtaining
experimentally verifiable predictions from a verbal/conceptual
theory. The predictions can subsequently be tested or verified
using data obtained from empirical experiments with humans
or animals, and comparing this data with the model predictions
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Myung, & Zhang, 2002).
Once in possession of the empirical data, both the prediction
and the testing can be performed by running computer programs.
Since this process is automated, it takes little human effort. This
is a general advantage of computationally formulated models, but
is especially useful for spatial memory models, since experiments
investigating spatial cognition using the classical, iterative cycle
of hypothesis formulation, prediction derivation and testing
(Godfrey-Smith, 2003) usually require multiple, sometimes large
environments (especially for navigation-scale spatial memory),
and are thus impractical and time consuming to perform in the
real world. In contrast, computational cognitive models of spatial
memory can be run in a large number of different simulated
environments, with different parameterizations, over a short
period of time and with little effort.
1.3. Motivation for the proposed neural mappings
Since cognitive modeling is concerned with describing and ex-
plaining cognitive phenomena, they should behave the same way
as humans (or animals) do. Comparison of model predictions with
behavioral evidence, ‘goodness of fit’, is themostwidespreadquan-
titative method of evaluating, judging and comparing cognitive
models (Pitt et al., 2002). In addition to fit, model complexity and
generalizability can (and should) also be analyzed qualitatively.
Frequently employed qualitative criteria include explanatory ade-
quacy, interpretability, and biological plausibility or realism (Cas-
simatis, Bello, & Langley, 2008; Myung, Pitt, & Kim, 2005).
Despite these criteria, the space of models possibly accounting
for experimental data is under-constrained. There can be multiple
models of comparable complexity achieving comparable goodness
of fit, and there might not be enough empirical data available
for full evaluation. Furthermore, it is often difficult to compare
cognitive models along qualitative dimensions. For example, there
is no consensus on which models are biologically plausible (there
are large differences between different approaches, ranging from
spiking neural network models with parameters derived directly
from electrophysiological measurements to AI-based methods
described as ‘biologically inspired’ based on vague functional
similarity). Many authors of cognitive models describe their work
without establishing how parts of their model relate to the
functionally similar biological implementation, making it difficult
to judge the degree of correspondence to the brain.
Since cognition is implemented by the brain, cognitive model-
ers would do well to take into account the known neuronal mech-
anisms underlying the cognitive phenomena they are trying to
model, even if not aiming to be highly biologically accurate. We
will propose tentative neural mappings of the models reviewed in
this paper for the following reasons. First, such mappings might
help assess the biological realism of models claiming to be biolog-
ically plausible, based on the degree of structural and functional
correspondence betweenmodels and the neural areas implement-
ing the cognitive mechanisms they account for. Since cognition is
implementedby the brain, close similarity between cognitivemod-
els and their neural counterparts is desirable (whether structural,
functional, paradigmatic, or otherwise). Clarifying neuronal corre-
spondencemight also help provide an additional quantitative eval-
uation criterion, by facilitating possible future verification using
neuronal data—such as imaging data from humans or electrophys-
iological data from animals.
Interestingly, such neuronal data can help in substantiating a
model even if there is very little similarity between the elementary
units of amodel and the brain (as is the casewith symbolicmodels,
which usually employ local and amodal symbols for representa-
tions, as opposed to the distributed and grounded representationsof the brain). A good example is the ACT-R cognitive architecture,
which is primarily symbolic but nevertheless has been shown to
be capable of not only fitting brain imaging data, but roughly pre-
dicting activation levels of brain areas (Anderson, Fincham, Qin, &
Stocco, 2008; Qin, Bothell, & Anderson, 2007). This shows that it
is possible even for high-level cognitive models which have little
to do with biological neurons to contribute to and guide research
in neuroscience; and that results in neuroscience can guide the de-
velopment and parameter adjustment of suchmodels despite their
structural differences. Thus, the mapping between model compo-
nents and brain areasmight be interesting even for neuroscientists
uninterested in pure cognitivemodeling, or cognitivemodelers un-
interested in pure neuroscience.
Finally, relating models and their components to brain areas
with known functions can facilitate their explanation, especially
for readers with a background in cognitive neuroscience or psy-
chology. Such mappings also help clarify and explicate structural
differences and similarities between individual cognitive models.
2. Neural correlates of spatial representations
Since this review is targeted mainly at researchers in cognitive
modeling, who might not be deeply familiar with the details of
the neurophysiology of spatial memory and spatial cognition, we
briefly summarize the neuroscientific literature concerning how
mammalian brains represent navigation space.1
This section is intended to provide a basis for the neural map-
pings of model parts (to provide further plausibility constraints, an
additional basis for comparisons, and a functional guide for model
parts). Our descriptions of the neural correlates of spatial represen-
tations are biased toward describing areas known to be important
and with (more or less) known functions, and are not meant to be
a complete review of all brain areas related to spatial cognition.
See Burgess (2008) and Moser et al. (2008) for more comprehen-
sive reviews of spatial cognition in the brain, and Kravitz, Saleem,
Baker, andMishkin (2011) for an overview of areas associatedwith
visuospatial processing.
2.1. Allocentric spatial memory
Four types of cells play an important role in processing allocen-
tric spatial representations in the mammalian brain, established
mostly through single-cell electrophysiological recording studies
frommammals (the following list is based onMadl, Franklin, Chen,
Montaldi, & Trappl, 2014)—see also Fig. 1:
1. Grid cells in themedial entorhinal cortex (MEC) show increased
firing at multiple locations, regularly positioned in a grid across
the environment consisting of equilateral triangles (Hafting,
Fyhn, Molden, Moser, & Moser, 2005). Grids from neighboring
cells share the same orientation, but have different and ran-
domly distributed offsets,meaning that a small number of them
can cover an entire environment. It has been suggested that grid
cells play a major role in path integration (PI),2 since their acti-
vation is updated depending on the animal’s movement speed
and direction (Burgess, 2008; Hafting et al., 2005;McNaughton,
Battaglia, Jensen, Moser, & Moser, 2006). There is evidence to
1 We apologize to readers who are already familiar the information in this
section.
2 Path integration refers to the integration of self-motion signals to maintain a
location estimate; also called dead reckoning. A disadvantage of exclusively using
path integration to estimate current location is that errors or noise accumulate upon
eachmovement, increasing until it eventually renders the location estimate useless,
unless corrected by allothetic sensory information Etienne, Maurer, and Séguinot
(1996).
T. Madl et al. / Neural Networks 65 (2015) 18–43 21Fig. 1. Grid cells, place cells, boundary-related cells, head-direction cells, and the neuronal basis of self-motion information. A.–D.: Four cell type firing fields associated
with allocentric spatial representation; as well as reviewed models accounting for them. A. Regular grid cell firing pattern from rat intracranial recording (black lines: rat
trajectory, red dots: placeswhere grid cell showed increased firing). B. Hippocampal place cell firing pattern (A and B fromBurgess, 2008). C. Firing pattern of a head-direction
cell tuned to about 150 allocentric direction (relative to distal landmarks or boundaries). D. Firing fields of ‘boundary vector cells’ identified in the rat entorhinal cortex. In
specific areas of the environment (highlighted with hot colors) these cells exhibit increased firing rates (from Solstad et al., 2008). (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)suggest that grid cells exist not only inmammals, but also in the
human entorhinal cortex (EC) (Doeller, Barry, & Burgess, 2011).
In contrast toMEC, neurons in the lateral EC exhibit little spatial
modulation, and are instead highly selective to sensory stimuli.
2. Head-direction cells (HD cells) fire whenever the animal’s
head is pointing in a certain direction. The primary circuit re-
sponsible for head direction signals projects from the dorsal
tegmental nucleus to the lateral mammillary nucleus, anterior
thalamus andpostsubiculum, terminating in the entorhinal cor-
tex (Taube, 2007). There is evidence that head direction cells
exist in the human brain within the medial parietal cortex
(Baumann & Mattingley, 2010).
3. Border cells and boundary vector cells (BVCs) are cells with
boundary related firing properties. The former (Lever, Burton,
Jeewajee, O’Keefe, & Burgess, 2009; Solstad, Boccara, Kropff,
Moser, &Moser, 2008) seem to fire in proximity to environment
boundaries, whereas the firing of the latter (Barry et al., 2006;
Burgess, 2008) depends on boundary proximity aswell as direc-
tion relative to the mammal’s head. Cells with these properties
have been found in the mammalian subiculum and entorhinal
cortex (Lever et al., 2009; Solstad et al., 2008), and there is also
some behavioral evidence substantiating their existence in hu-
mans (Barry et al., 2006).
4. Place cells are pyramidal cells in the hippocampus which ex-
hibit strongly increased firing when the animal is in specific
spatial locations, largely independent from orientation in open
environments (Burgess, 2008; O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971),
thus providing a representation of an animal’s (or human’s Ek-
strom et al., 2003) location in the environment. A possible ex-
planation for the formation of place cell firing fields is that
they emerge from a combination of grid cell inputs on different
scales (Moser et al., 2008; Solstad, Moser, & Einevoll, 2006). It
has also been proposed that place fieldsmight bemainly driven
by environmental geometry, arising from a sum of boundary
vector cell inputs (Barry et al., 2006; Hartley, Burgess, Lever,
Cacucci, & O’Keefe, 2000); or by a combination of grid cell and
boundary vector cell inputs (Madl et al., 2014). Apart from
information about the current spatial location, hippocampal
place cells also participate in place–object associations (Kim,
Delcasso, & Lee, 2011; Manns & Eichenbaum, 2009), associ-
ating place cell representations of specific locations with the
representations of specific objects in recognition memory (the
perirhinal cortex, among others, is heavily involved in recogni-
tion memory for objects—Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Yonelinas,
Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005). In addition, in the primate hip-
pocampus, view-dependent instead of place-dependent cells
have also been identified (dubbed spatial-view cells Rolls & Xi-
ang, 2006). Finally, an interesting cell type with spatially lo-
calized firing activity has been found in the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), representing goal or reward locations (Hok,
Save, Lenck-Santini, & Poucet, 2005).Hippocampal place cells seem to encode long-term allocentric
spatial representations of environments (this is suggested by
the spatially localized firing of place cells, the observation that
this firing did not depend on heading direction and remains
stable in an environment for several weeks, and finally the
associations between place cells and specific objects). It has been
argued that multiple such representations are learned for different
environments, with different frames of reference and on different
scales. Evidence for this includes the observation that place cells
‘re-map’ when rats enter a new environment (the firing fields
of the same cells reflect a completely different map in different
environments), and the observation that their firing field sizes can
significantly differ (Derdikman & Moser, 2010).
Allocentric representations allow not only the storage and sub-
sequent recall of remembered routes, they also allow the calculat-
ing of novel routes, shortcuts or detours (important especially after
changes in the environment, e.g. when a known route is blocked).
Furthermore, it is possible to keep track of more allocentrically en-
coded object positions than egocentric positions—since the latter
are encoded relative to the agent and thus require updates as the
agent moves through the environment, making accurate egocen-
tric representations of large numbers of objects intractable.
Such allocentric representations of physical locations in the
environment have been called ‘cognitive maps’ – a term coined
by Tolman (1948) – and there is substantial evidence that the
hippocampal–entorhinal complex is the main neural correlate
involved in their storage and recall (Moser et al., 2008).
Another proposed form of allocentric representation is a topo-
logical map. Topological maps lack metric information (such as
distances or directions), but provide adjacency and containment
information and thus allow route planning as well (although plan-
ning optimal routes can be difficult) (Booij, Terwijn, Zivkovic, &
Krose, 2007). There is no well-established neural correlate of pos-
sible topological representations in the brain; although compu-
tational models with topological assumptions have successfully
accounted for some hippocampal experimental data (Chen, Kloost-
erman, Brown, & Wilson, 2012; Dabaghian, Cohn, & Frank, 2011)
(and there is some neural evidence for the involvement of poste-
rior parietal cortex (PPC) Calton & Taube, 2009 and retrosplenial
cortex (RSC) Epstein, 2008).
2.2. Egocentric spatial memory
For humans and primates, vision is the primary perceptual
modality, having the largest cortical area associated with its
processing. There are multiple pathways originating from the
visual cortices. Apart from a pathway supporting object vision
along ventral areas (the ‘what’ pathway), two others have been
proposed which are relevant for spatial memory.
The primary visual cortex (V1) located in the occipital lobe
projects visual information through higher visual cortices to
the Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC). The parieto-medial temporal
22 T. Madl et al. / Neural Networks 65 (2015) 18–43pathway connects this occipito-parietal circuit with areas in
the medial temporal lobe including hippocampal, entorhinal and
subicular areas involved in processing long-term allocentric spatial
representations supporting spatial navigation (see above) (Kravitz
et al., 2011).
On the other hand, many brain areas involved in the represen-
tation of egocentric space reside in the posterior parietal cortex.
Posterior parietal areas can be said to extract object positions rel-
ative to the agent from sensory information. Patients with parietal
lesions might have intact primary sensory and motor representa-
tions, but often suffer from spatial neglect—they are unable to per-
ceive one side of space (Husain, 2008).
Evidence suggests that the precuneus is the main brain area
concerned with multiple types of egocentric representations, as
well as transformations between them (Kravitz et al., 2011;
Vogeley et al., 2004; Zaehle et al., 2007). The precuneus seems to
coordinate spatial processing in the reference frames of the eyes
and the head with controlling body and limb-centered actions (in
addition to the intraparietal and postcentral sulci and the parieto-
occipital region; Plank, 2009; Vogeley et al., 2004)—for example,
area 5d within this parietal area seems to represent reach vectors
(hand position relative to reach target).
Neuropsychological studies have also implicated the lateral in-
traparietal area (LIP) in representing visual stimuli in the reference
frame of the body (Snyder, Grieve, Brotchie, & Andersen, 1998),
the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) containing receptive fields with
head-centered reference frames Duhamel, Colby, and Goldberg
(1998), the medial intraparietal area (MIP) in the encoding of ob-
ject locations in eye-centric coordinates (Pesaran, Nelson, & Ander-
sen, 2006), and area 6a (Marzocchi, Breveglieri, Galletti, & Fattori,
2008). The latter two areas have also been called the ‘parietal reach
region’ and seem to encode the location of reach targets in an eye-
centered reference frame (Bhattacharyya, Musallam, & Andersen,
2009). (See Kravitz et al., 2011 for a detailed review of visuospatial
processing in the brain.)
Finally, the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) and the parahippocampal
place area (PPA) in the parahippocampal cortex both seem to be
involved in the visual representations of places, since they respond
strongly to scenes such as landscapes or cityscapes but weakly to
non-scene objects (such as animals or small objects).
Apart from visuospatial representations, the basal ganglia also
play an important role in egocentric navigation, and are thought
to associate a cue with a reward (Packard & McGaugh, 1996),
triggering guidance behavior along a known route. The basal
ganglia can thus encode the body turns/directions to take when
landmarks are recognized, depending on the spatial relationship
between the landmark and the body (e.g. turn left at the big
tree). This encoding allowsnavigation based on simple associations
between actions and egocentric spatial relations (also called ‘taxon
navigation’, as opposed to ‘locale navigation’ which requires
allocentric spatial representations). This taxon strategy seems to
be in use mainly when a route is well-known (Hartley, Maguire,
Spiers, & Burgess, 2003). In contrast, novel route planning requires
additional allocentric representations (see previous section).
2.3. Structures involved in transformation
Since sensory information is perceived from the reference
frame of the observing agent, allocentric spatial representations
must be built via transformation of the sensory input. Furthermore,
allocentric information has to be transferred back into an
egocentric reference frame in order to allow spatial actions.
Because of its interconnectionswith brain areas associatedwith
both egocentric and allocentric spatial representations, it has been
suggested that the RSC is involved with translations of frames
of reference. The RSC receives direct inputs from visual areas V2and V4, and egocentric sensory information from parietal areas 7a
and LIP, among others; as well as inputs from the hippocampal
formation and the anterior thalamus usually associated with
allocentric position and heading information (Vann, Aggleton, &
Maguire, 2009).
Area 7a in the posterior parietal cortex is another area strongly
connected to both the medial temporal areas associated with
allocentric representations, and the parietal areas associated with
egocentric representations. Thus, area 7a could also play a role
in transforming between reference frames. For example, neurons
in area 7a can transform viewer- to object-centered spatial
information (Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007; Crowe, Averbeck, &
Chafee, 2008).
2.4. Structures involved in associative and reward-based learning
Hebb’s rule is a prevalent and frequently modeled associative
learning rule, which is based on the idea of activity-dependent
synaptic modification, and proposing that a change in the strength
of a connection is a function of the neural activities of the con-
nected neurons. Hebbian learning is often summarized as ‘neu-
rons that fire together, wire together’. There is strong empirical
evidence for such a learning mechanism ubiquitously occurring in
brains (Song, Miller, & Abbott, 2000). This learning rule is critical
for associative learning in spatial memory paradigms—for exam-
ple, for learning associations between the representation of a rat’s
current location, and sensory stimuli at that location. In a variant
of Hebbian learning, called competitive learning, neurons of one
population compete with each other to respond to the pattern ap-
pearing in another population from which they receive input (the
more strongly a neuron responds to the input, the more it inhibits
other neurons, and the more its connection strengths to highly ac-
tive input neurons increase) (Grossberg, 1987; Kaski & Kohonen,
1994; Rumelhart & Zipser, 1985).
As opposed to the unsupervised, associative Hebbian learning
rule, reward-based learning is also frequently observed in spatial
memory experiments. As mentioned above, the mPFC seems to be
involved in representing goal or reward locations (Hok et al., 2005)
(and has also been suggested to be involved in responding to re-
wards). Animals including humans have a propensity to seek out
rewards, and are able to learn the spatial locations of such rewards.
The primary neural correlates of reward-learning include the or-
bitofrontal cortex (OFC, which seems to encode stimulus reward
value), the amygdala, and the ventral striatum; all three show in-
creased activity during the expectation of a reward. The dopamine
system also plays an important role, being involved in the signal-
ing of error in the prediction of reward (presumably aiding learn-
ing and facilitating the improvement of reward predictions). To
select an action based on an expected reward, stimulus–response
or response–reward associations have to be learned; empirical
evidence implicates the dorsal striatum in this process (which
exhibits increased activity when a contingency is established
between responses and reward) (Maia, 2009; O’Doherty, 2004).
Reinforcement learning theory has been used in attempts to
mathematically formalize the process of reward-based learning
through interacting with an environment. Reinforcement learning
(RL) agents represent the world as a set of states S, a set of actions
A possible in each state and leading to a new state, and possible
rewards r. They learn from the consequences of their actions, and
try to select actions based on past experiences (exploitation) as
well as novel choices (exploration). The name comes from the
reinforcement signal – a numerical reward – used in such models;
RL agents aim to choose actions that maximize the reward they
obtain over time (Woergoetter & Porr, 2008). It has been argued
that mathematically derived solutions to RL can plausibly be
implemented in brains, based on the reward-relevant brain areas
T. Madl et al. / Neural Networks 65 (2015) 18–43 23listed in the previous section (explainingRL and its correspondence
to brains would exceed the scope of this paper; see Maia, 2009 for
an explanation and review of evidence). Reinforcement learning
can be used to learn which action to take in each location, e.g. to
learn how to navigate to a food source (see also Fig. 4 and some of
the models reviewed below).
3. Computational cognitive models of spatial memory
3.1. Introduction
Computational models attempt to formally describe an aspect
(or aspects) of cognition in a simplified fashion, allowing their
simulation on computers (McClelland, 2009; Sun, 2008b). Compu-
tational cognitive modeling is concerned with achieving a better
understanding of various cognitive functionalities through compu-
tational models of representations, mechanisms, and processes.
Cognitive models should be functional—they should perform
well at the task they were designed for (which can be difficult,
especially for challenging tasks such as trying to robustlymap real-
world environments).
Psychological or cognitive plausibility are also important—these
models aim to model cognitive phenomena (spatial memory and
associated processes), and should correspond to them as closely as
possible in terms of the mechanisms, processes, and representa-
tions employed, and behavioral measures produced. They should
account for empirical data as well as possible (high ‘goodness of
fit’), and should do so in the simplest possible way (low complex-
ity), making as few unsubstantiated assumptions as possible. They
should also have the ability to generalize to new data, not only ac-
count for the data provided to the model during development and
training (Myung et al., 2005).
Cognitivemodels should also be as biologically plausible as pos-
sible within their paradigm. Although many cognitive models are
not concerned with the physiological details of neural function-
ing (with the exception of biological/spiking neural networks—see
Section 3.4), the underlying neuroscience of the modeled cogni-
tive phenomena is nevertheless arguably relevant. Functions of
the mind are implemented in brains; thus, neuroscience can pro-
vide valuable input regarding the structure and function of plau-
sible models, even for those not intending to model the neuron
level. Further advantages of taking neural implementation into
consideration include constraining the model space (reducing the
large number of algorithms possibly accounting for given behav-
ior data), providing additional evaluation criteria, and facilitating
model comparison by establishing analogies between representa-
tions in models and in brains (see also Section 1.3).
Clarification of the elemental units used by models, and how
they relate to neural substrate, is critical in evaluating biological
plausibility. The correspondence does not need to be on the neu-
ron level—symbolic cognitive models can also structurally corre-
spond to brains on a higher level (e.g. on the level of brain areas
and their connectivity). Explicating the correspondence between
model components and brain areas, as done by the researchers
of ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2008) (who have also performed brain
imaging experiments for validation), helps to verify structural sim-
ilarity between the model and the corresponding neural substrate,
and thus also to evaluate claims of biological plausibility. Describ-
ing such neural mappings is one of the aims of this section, as well
as establishing tentative mappings based on functional correspon-
dence in cases where the authors did not explicitly describe them
in their work, as is the case for the majority of models outside of
computational neuroscience.
Clarification of the following properties is also important in
characterizing computational models of spatial memory (partiallybased on O’Reilly, 1998 and Webb, 20013).
• The level of modeling (characterizing the elemental units),
• The types of representation accounted for (e.g. egocentric,
allocentric, metric, topological)
• The learning mechanism, if any (e.g. Hebbian learning, rein-
forcement learning)
• The generality and abstraction of the models (the range of phe-
nomena accounted for, and complexity relative to the modeled
phenomena)
• Structural similarity (how well models represent the underly-
ing neural mechanisms)
• Performancematch or ‘goodness of fit’ to behavior data (towhat
extent themodel canmatch target behavior; useful for compar-
ing different models of the same phenomena).
It is important to note that this review is limited to computa-
tional models of cognition concerned with navigation space, that
were published in the last twodecades,4 and as such excludesmod-
els of diagrammatic spatial reasoning, models of low-level sensory
representations, robotic models unconcerned with biological cog-
nition, and other models which might include spatial information
on a different scale or for a different purpose. Furthermore, we ex-
clude reactive navigation models without representations, which
might allow agents to solve problems in space, but cannot be said
to model spatial memory.
Finally, we do not claim to review every single model involving
spatialmemory (such an endeavor could fill a book); the aim of this
review is to summarize representative models for major modeling
directions (of any set of models which are highly similar in terms
of paradigm, structure and functionality, only the most recent one
is reviewed; similarly, if the same first author publishes multiple
times on a model, only the most recent version of the model is
included).
3.2. Overview
The spatialmemorymodels reviewed in this section are divided
into three categories, inspired by major modeling paradigms in
the field of computational psychology (Sun, 2008a). The section
‘symbolic spatial memory models’ describes models emphasizing
explicit rules and localist representations based on symbolic
logic (Bringsjord, 2008). In contrast, ‘neural network-based spatial
memorymodels’ are based on a number of simple processing units
affecting each other via weighted connections, operate in parallel,
usually employ distributed representations, and commonly learn
rules from training data instead of encoding explicit rules (Thomas
& McClelland, 2008). Finally, we also review a number of spatial
memory models that are a part of cognitive architectures (which
are concernedwithmodeling awide range of cognitive phenomena
in addition to spatial memory, and are often employing a
combination of the mentioned paradigms).
We have confined our survey to these relevant categories and
model types to keep it within the limited space available.
Each of these types of models have different strengths and roles
in modeling and understanding spatial memory. Symbolic models
3 Criteria specific to neuroscience and unimportant for characterizing purely
cognitive models have been excluded.
4 We used the academic search engines Scopus, JSTOR, Google Scholar, Microsoft
Academic, and arXiv; searching for keywords (and their combinations) relevant
to this review, including computational, cognitive, spatial, models, spatial memory,
cognitive map, hippocampus, place cells, egocentric representations, allocentric
representations, navigation, orientation, localization, mapping, SLAM, symbolic,
connectionist, cognitive architectures. Furthermore, we manually searched the
Comparative Repository of CognitiveArchitectures (by theBICA society) for relevant
models.
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cerned with neuron level phenomena), and are often functionally
more powerful than neural network models (they can often per-
form more complex tasks). They usually have less structural sim-
ilarity to brains, and are thus less constrained (even if validated
against behavior data, it is difficult to evaluate multiple symbolic
models performing a similar task with comparable goodness-of-
fit). In contrast, neural network models are often more similar
to the neurophysiological implementation (both in terms of rep-
resentation and mechanism) and are thus easier to constrain by
established neuroscientific knowledge and by additional types of
data (such as neural recordings or brain imaging). However, this
paradigm often makes it difficult to implement complex cognitive
processes, especially those requiring serial processing steps (for
example, none of the neural network models are able to perform
spatial reasoning or loop closure, in contrast to some symbolic ap-
proaches). Finally, cognitive architectures can follow either or both
of these paradigms, and have the additional advantage of incor-
porating multiple cognitive mechanisms—thus, they can perform,
and be evaluated against, different tasks and datasets.
Apart from categorizing the models based on their underly-
ing modeling paradigm, we will also group them into models
evaluated in simplified, simulated environments, and into models
which are capable of dealing with – and being evaluated in – real
world environments (such as robotic implementations). In general,
robotics emphasizes high-performance solutions to low-level ‘sen-
sor problems’ (e.g. dealing with sensory uncertainty/noise or pro-
cessing or recognizing complex sensory data), and aims for high
performance (accuracy, efficiency, etc.) instead of cognitive plausi-
bility (Jefferies & Yeap, 2008). However, as Gallistel (2008) points
out, the nature of the computational problems of navigation and
map making based on limited information does not depend on
whether one is studying biological or artificial systems. Thus, the
latter could help in understanding the former.
Robots and animals must perform similar computations when
trying to make sense of space. Computational models of cognition
operating in similar environments to themodeled biological agent,
and dealing with similar difficulties posed by the real world (such
as complexity, limited knowledge, uncertainty, or noise), can be
regarded as being more plausible than models not accounting
for such difficulties (Webb, 2000). This is the main motivation
for dedicating subsections to cognitive models evaluated in the
real-world (but excluding systems concerned with practical robot
performance rather than investigating cognition).
The following list presents an overview of the models reviewed
below. Models embodied on robots capable of running in the real
world are printed in bold, and, for clarity, the first mention of a
model in each subsection below is underlined. A comparative table
of all reviewed models, with additional properties for comparison,
can be found at the end of this section (Table 1).
• Symbolic models (Section 3.3)
– Allocentric models
∗ (Yeap, Wong, & Schmidt, 2008)
∗ (Jefferies, Baker, & Weng, 2008)
∗ perceptual wayfinding model (Raubal, 2001)
– Egocentric models
∗ NAVIGATOR (Gopal & Smith, 1990)
– Allocentric+ egocentric
∗ HSSH (Beeson, Modayil, & Kuipers, 2010)
∗ (Franz, Stürzl, Hübner, & Mallot, 2008)
∗ DP-model (Brom, Vyhnánek, Lukavský, Waller, & Kadlec,
2012)
• Neural network-based models (Section 3.4)
– Allocentric models
∗ (Burgess, Jackson, Hartley, & O’Keefe, 2000)· (later extended in simulation as the BVC model by Barry
et al., 2006)
∗ (Strösslin, Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, & Gerstner, 2005)
∗ (Barrera, Cáceres, Weitzenfeld, & Ramirez-Amaya, 2011)
∗ (Schölkopf & Mallot, 1995)
∗ (Voicu, 2003)
∗ (McNaughton et al., 1996)
∗ (Erdem & Hasselmo, 2012)
– Allocentric+ egocentric
∗ (Byrne et al., 2007)
• Cognitive Architectures (Section 3.5)
– Allocentric models
∗ LIDA (Madl, Franklin, Chen, & Trappl, 2013)
– Egocentric models
∗ ACT-R/S (Harrison et al., 2003)
∗ CLARION (Sun & Zhang, 2004)
– Allocentric+ egocentric
∗ Casimir (Schultheis & Barkowsky, 2011)
3.3. Symbolic spatial memory models
Symbolic models of spatial memory are concerned with explic-
itly representing spatial knowledge in a declarative form as facts
and rules. They are based on the assumption that cognition consists
of discrete mental states (representations), which can be modeled
as localist symbols (in contrast, in neural network-based models
the representations are not discrete, but constitute distributed and
potentially overlapping patterns of activation—see next section).
A number of processes operate on these representations, creating,
modifying, or deleting them (Smolensky, 1987). One of the earliest
definitions of such symbolic models has been put forth by Newell
and Simon (1976), coining the term of a ‘physical symbol system’,
a class of systems having symbols, being capable of manipulating
them, and being realizable within our physical universe.
Symbolic models are often based on cognitive science theories
(most frequently information processing models), and thus are
able to claim a degree of cognitive plausibility. There is usually
very little similarity between the elementary representations of
symbolic models and biological neurons (mainly because of the
choice of localist and amodal representations, in contrast to the
distributed andmoremodal representations of the brain; Barsalou,
2008; Martin & Chao, 2001). However, they can still correspond
to the brain on a higher level (e.g. functional correspondence
to brain areas, as established for ACT-R). Despite the structural
and paradigmatic difference, and for reasons mentioned in the
Introduction, brain areas corresponding to model parts will be
pointed out based on such functional correspondences where
applicable.
3.3.1. Models evaluated in real-world environments
A few cognitive models of spatial memory have been imple-
mented in robotic systems capable of navigating in the real world.
Jefferies and Yeap (2008) provides a survey of such cognitive map-
ping approaches that have been designed to work on robots. Usu-
ally, robotic implementations following the symbolic5 approach
build metric representations of the local environment using an ap-
proach called SLAM (Simultaneous Localization and Mapping). Re-
cent SLAM approaches are capable of recognizing a place the robot
has seen before (this is called ‘loop closing’), and correcting er-
rors in the map representation by exploiting and correcting for the
difference between expected and observed location on the map.
5 A notable exception is RatSLAM (Milford & Wyeth, 2010), a model based on
attractor neural networks (which however is not a cognitive model, and is not
intended to model behavior or biology).
T. Madl et al. / Neural Networks 65 (2015) 18–43 25Fig. 2. Overview of symbolic models evaluated in real-world environments. A: (Jefferies et al., 2008; Yeap et al., 2008); bothmodels create local metric maps (absolute space
representations – ASRs – consisting of boundary elements); the latter model also builds a global metric map (Memory for Immediate Surroundings—MFIS) with which it can
perform loop closing. B: HSSH (Beeson et al., 2010). C: (Franz et al., 2008). Deterministic learning is a collective term for all mechanisms that learn by adding new symbolic
representations to memory upon perceiving a new object (as opposed to probabilistic or neural network learning mechanisms). Local maps represent spaces appearing to
enclose the agent (such as a room). Global maps can represent and align multiple local maps in the same reference frame.SLAM is usually implemented by a probabilistic state estimation
method, integrating self-motion information and landmark obser-
vations in a statistically optimal fashion (Jefferies & Yeap, 2008;
Thrun & Leonard, 2008).
The core ideas of SLAM – using probabilistic inference to deal
with uncertainty and noise and to infer near-optimal estimates of
the locations of the agent, and objects in its environment – do not
contradict the cognitive sciences. They fit in well with the recent
‘Bayesian brain’ hypothesis (Knill & Pouget, 2004); the idea that
the brain integrates information in a statistically optimal fashion.
There is evidence that spatial cues might be integrated statistically
optimally in humans (Nardini, Jones, Bedford, & Braddick, 2008)
and animals (Cheng, Shettleworth, Huttenlocher, & Rieser, 2007)
on the behavioral level. Computational models resembling SLAM
– using probabilistic state estimation – have been proposed to
explain spatial orientation and cognitive mapping (Cheung, Ball,
Milford, Wyeth, & Wiles, 2012; Fox & Prescott, 2010). It has also
been suggested that hippocampal place cells might be able to
perform approximate Bayesian inference on the neuronal level,
based on electrophysiological recording evidence (Madl et al.,
2014).
However, the representation implementation is highly impor-
tant for judging the plausibility of such probabilisticmodels (e.g. in
terms of their structural accuracy, and levels of abstraction and
modeling). In SLAM approaches in robotics, maps are stored in dif-
ferent ways, most commonly as covariance matrices, or as occu-
pancy grids (two-dimensional matrices with entries storing the
probability of occupancy), or tree-based representations (Thrun &
Leonard, 2008). In the absence of psychological or neuroscientific
data substantiating the existence of explicit covariance represen-
tations in human or animal cognition, and of biologically realistic
implementations, it would be difficult to argue for the plausibil-
ity of covariance matrices as cognitive models of spatial memory.
Here we only include models where authors explicitly address the
relationship of their models to cognitive science or neurobiology
(unfortunately, although citing empirical evidence, few of these
authors evaluate their models against empirical data from hu-
mans or animals). For reviews of robotic SLAM, see e.g. Bailey
and Durrant-Whyte (2006), Durrant-Whyte and Bailey (2006) and
Thrun and Leonard (2008).Building on work by Yeap (1988) – one of the first symbolic
computational models of cognitive maps – a number of robotic
systems have been built (many of which have departed from the
original claim of being computational theories of cognitive maps
and will therefore be omitted). Yeap suggests the computation
of abstract allocentric maps of a region (from the shape and
disposition of surfaces/boundaries relative to the agent) which the
author calls ‘absolute space representation’ or ASR (see Fig. 2(A)).
Multiple ASRs can be interconnected as a traversable network to
form a cognitive map of the entire environment, and afford the
notion of ‘places’; a network of ASRs can model a network of
places, with exits leading from one to the other, such as rooms in a
building. The elemental representation in ASRs is a list of triplets,
each representing a boundary element (BE), and containing its size,
angle to the next adjacent BE, and whether it is empty space, not
empty, or occluded.
• Based on this model, Yeap et al. (2008) developed a robotic
system capable of building allocentric maps. The robot uses a
simple exploration strategy (move forward in a straight line, stop
when encountering an obstacle, turn away from the obstacle but
maintain forward direction), after which it has to find its way
‘home’ (back to its starting location).
It used 8 simple sonar sensors tomeasure distances to obstacles
and boundaries, and built a metric map based on both the robot
path, and linear surfaces around it approximated from sonar data.
This map was subsequently split, or merged, into distinct regions
(e.g. corridors and rooms) using features such as average width
(e.g. corridors are long and narrow), and employing the split and
merge algorithm (Pavlidis & Horowitz, 1974) to find continuous
regions. Each continuous motion segment of the robot (without
stopping or turning) was represented as an ASR (consisting of
multiple boundary elements from sonar data). The robot was able
to use the final network of ASRs it has built using the split and
merge algorithm to find its way back ‘home’ by backtracking the
distances traveled.
The robot could localize itself using ‘confidence maps’ com-
puted from the similarity between the currently perceived region
or ASR (current sonar readings), and all stored ASRs. The authors
reported that the localization was accurate with respect to the oc-
cupied region (i.e. the error was smaller than the size the regions).
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to its starting position even when the ASRs computed during the
outward and inward journeywere inconsistent—not requiring cor-
rect and consistent metric representations for homing is the main
strength of the model. However, it could not match re-observed
boundaries with those in its memory, and thus it is unable to ‘close
the loop’.
Themodel does notmake any claims of structural accuracywith
regard to its neurobiological equivalent. Based on functional sim-
ilarity, ASR regions contain some of the information represented
by place cells (‘confidence maps’ on ASR regions, similarly to place
cells, carry information regarding the currently occupied space),
goal cells (ASRs regions, like goal cells, can constitute goal repre-
sentations) and by boundary vector cells (boundary elements carry
boundary size and angle information).
• Also drawing on the ideas of Jefferies et al. (2008) and Yeap
(1988) proposed that a cognitivemapmight consist of a topological
global map containing metric local space representations, aiming
to benefit from the advantages of both—simple localization and
metric consistency of the local maps, and easier ‘loop closing’ with
the help of global maps (as well as the confinement of location
errors to the local maps). The idea of separate local and global
representations is consistentwithmost empirical cognitive science
research (Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; Poucet, 1993; although there
is some debate regarding whether and which mechanisms/areas
are metric or topological). In contrast to the previously described
model, the robot by Jefferies et al. (2008) used laser rangefinders as
sensors (which provide more accuracy and resolution than simple
sonar sensors).
Their approach turns the raw laser data (distance measure-
ments) into lines representing boundaries, finds the exits (gaps in
the boundary), and then computes ASRs based on this information.
Different ASRs representing local regions can subsequently be con-
nected topologically via the identified exits to form a global map.
Finally, with the help of this topological map, they also build
a global map of limited extent containing the last few local
spaces visited (called ‘Memory for the Immediate Surroundings’,
MFIS), providing easier recognition that the robot has re-entered
a previously observed part of the environment (loop closing). This
model is one of only two reviewed models capable of building a
globalmap andof loop closing (the other being Beeson et al., 2010—
see below).
The authors argue for the psychological plausibility of their
model using the empirical evidence for local and global spatial
maps (Poucet, 1993) and multiple reference frames for different
parts of an environment (Derdikman & Moser, 2010; McNaughton
et al., 2006).
Themodel does not aim for structural resemblance to the brain.
As it is also based onYeap (1988), tentative arguments of functional
similarity can be made between ASR regions and place cells, and
boundary elements and boundary vector cells. No equivalent of
a consistent, metric, global map has been found in the brain (the
sameplace cells participate in representing very different locations
in different environments; there is no one-to-one mapping as in
the MFIS).
• Beeson et al. (2010) also propose a spatial memory model
combining the strengths of topological and metrical approaches,
calling it HSSH (Hybrid Spatial Semantic Hierarchy), an extension
of the SSH model proposed by Kuipers (2000). The HSSH has
four major levels of representation: a local metrical level (in
which the agent builds a metric Local Perceptual Map—LPM),
a local topological level (in which the agent identifies discrete
places in a large-scale environment and describes paths in it), a
global topological level (for resolving structural ambiguities and
determining how the environment is best described as a graph of
places, paths and regions), and a global metrical level (describingthe environment in a single metric global map using the same
reference frame).
On the first level, the LPM is built using probabilistic SLAM
(Thrun & Leonard, 2008) based on laser rangefinders, and rep-
resented as an occupancy grid (a discretized grid in which each
cell contains the probability of being occupied by an obstacle). On
the local topological level, a discrete set of ‘places’ and ‘path seg-
ments’ connecting themare identified (using an approach based on
Voronoi graphs and recognized gateways/doors). The global topo-
logical map is built by creating a tree of all possible topological
maps (map hypotheses) consistent with current experience. After
each travel action, every map hypothesis is extended; if it leads to
a predicted transition to a known state, the hypothesis can be up-
dated or refuted based on the subsequent observation. This allows
‘closing the loop’ and pruning the tree of topological maps when
places are revisited.
Finally, on the global metrical level, a metric map of the entire
environment in a global reference frame can be assembled on the
structural skeleton provided by the global topological map (and
based on the known robot trajectory and the displacements be-
tween places to appropriately translate local frames of reference).
HSSH is the only model except for Jefferies et al. (2008) capable of
building a global map and closing the loop.
Although not aiming for structural similarity to the brain, the
HSSH and its predecessors claim to be ‘theories of robot and human
commonsense knowledge of large-scale space: the cognitive map’
(Kuipers, 2008). Unfortunately, no comparisons of themodel’s per-
formancewith human data have been performed. In terms of func-
tional similarity, the occupancy grid employed as the low-level
metric representation bears some resemblance to hippocampal
place cells, as both can be used to infer the most likely location of
the agent, as well as the most likely locations of boundaries (Barry
et al., 2006). However, there are also significant differences, includ-
ing the resolution (1 cm in some SLAM approaches, as opposed to
the sizes of place cell firing fields,6 which range from 20 cm or less
tomultiplemeters, Kjelstrup et al., 2008; O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996),
constancy (place fields can be destroyed or changed by adding bar-
riers or making other changes in the environment), shape proper-
ties (occupancy grid cells are square, place cells can have multiple
firing fields of different round shapes), representation (occupancy
grid cells contain probabilities, place cell firing rates almost cer-
tainly do not, since they strongly depend on factors such as run-
ning speed), among others (Moser et al., 2008). Independently of
the differences in the representation employed, probabilistic infer-
ence (the mechanism which SLAM is based on) has been argued to
be plausible based on empirical data (see above).
• Franz et al. (2008) have developed a robotic system on
a Khepera miniature robot that accounts for egocentric route
navigation, as well as allocentric topological navigation and global
metric navigation (with the first two working on the robot and the
latter implemented in a simulation), building on their earlier work
(Franz & Mallot, 2000).
Route navigation (or taxon navigation) works by storing simple
associations of actions to egocentric spatial relations. Several such
associations can be concatenated to routes that might lead from
the current location to a goal location (see Section 2). Franz et al.
(2008) use a panoramic stereo camera to calculate the disparities
of N = 72 image sectors, after identifying each sector in both
images (disparities are defined as how much an image sector
6 Despite these sizes of individual place fields, it is possible to decode the animal’s
positionmore accurately using the cumulative activity ofmultiple overlapping cells
and statistical methods (up to an error of about 8 cm based on the spike train alone,
Brown, Frank, Tang, Quirk, & Wilson, 1998, or about 3 cm based on theta phase
coding, Jensen & Lisman, 2000).
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these disparities, distances can be computed using elementary
trigonometry). They represent a place using a ‘disparity signature’,
a list of disparities and their corresponding reliabilities. Storing
such place representations allows a simple homing by using a
strategy of calculating the disparity signatures for several possible
movements, and then choosing the movement that minimizes the
difference between the current and the goal disparity signature.
Sequences of distinguishable disparity signatures can constitute a
route and allow taxon navigation.
Topological navigation integrates routes leading through the
same place to a representation that can be used for navigating to
multiple goals. In this model, topological navigation is afforded
by a ‘view graph’, which is built by measuring similarities
between views (using maximal pixel-wise cross-correlation), and
connecting two routes whenever two views are sufficiently similar
and whenever the robot succeeds in homing to this similar
view. This system could successfully explore an environment, and
perform homing and shortcut planning in the real world. However,
it requires views to be unique (since it connect routes when views
match)—thus, it cannot close the loop in environments with non-
unique views.
The model was also extended by an approach to survey naviga-
tion in a simulation. This requires a representation in a common
frame of reference. The model attempts to construct a global met-
ricmapbymetrically embedding the viewgraphusing an approach
based on multi-dimensional scaling (MDS).
Franz et al. (2008) argue that their navigation strategies
are ‘biomimetic’; citing behavioral evidence from studies with
insects, which lend strong support to the claim that insects seem
to use mainly view-based homing for navigation (Graham &
Collett, 2002)—a strategy resembling the ‘disparity minimization’
approach of the authors. However, they do not claim any structural
similarity to brains, whether mammalian or insectile. The taxon
navigation strategy can be implemented in principle by the
basal ganglia storing routes as stimulus–reaction mappings, in
combination with neurons encoding views, such as spatial-view
cells or PPA neurons (see Section 2). However, even on the
functional level, this similarity is highly tentative, since mammals
can robustly navigate to goals even in dynamic environments, or
after changes in the environment (which would interfere with the
simple correlation-based similarity measure of this model), and
also because it is highly unlikely that mammals recognize views
based purely on disparities (for example, scene recognition works
almost as well on computer screens as in real scenes, suggesting
that stereo vision does not play a major role).
3.3.2. Models evaluated in simulations
Computational experiments in simulations have to deal with
fewer issues such as complexity, sensory inaccuracy, or noise.
Thus, their developers often have the resources to endow them
with a larger range of abilities and to account for more tasks
and paradigms (at the expense of less similarity to the actual
environment of the modeled biological cognition).
• One of the first symbolic models of spatial memory in urban
environments, growing out of the symbolic AI paradigm of the
last century, was the NAVIGATOR model by Gopal, Klatzky, and
Smith (1989), implemented in LISP. It runs in a simple environment
consisting of horizontal and vertical streets, as well as ‘plots’—
locations and associated sets of objects (such as houses)—and
associated decision points—points at which navigational decisions
can be made. The environment is represented in a predicate
calculus-based language. The agent (called NS, navigating system)
can perceive information from the plot associatedwith its location,
as well as other plots visible in each feasible direction of view; andcan either turn in the four modeled directions (to perceive in that
direction) or move in one of those directions.
Upon receiving an input, the NS selects themost salient objects,
and stores them in a workingmemory (WM).WMhas the function
of processing perceived information, transferring it to long-term
memory (LTM), monitoring instructions, and planning paths to a
goal through pattern matching. LTM in turn permanently stores
conceptual, spatial, and goal knowledge; in the form of semantic
network representations (e.g. decision-point 2 associated-with
house, house color-of red) which can decay (‘forgetting’). These
representations are connected by ‘links’ which represent spatial
relations, and can be learned either from perceptual input (when
two locations are present inWMat the same time), or from explicit
instructions connecting two locations (e.g. ‘go from A to B’).
Based on its semantic network representation, NAVIGATOR is
able to find goal locations and plan novel paths. The agent runs
in a very simple (simulated, discrete and static) environment.
The model is claimed to qualitatively replicate several aspects of
human spatial behavior, such as way-finding errors (three types
of errors made by NAVIGATOR appear similar to humans—errors
made at locations with more information, at locations requiring
complex navigational actions, and errors due to misidentification
of the goal) (Gopal & Smith, 1990). No quantitative comparison
against human data is performed.
The NAVIGATORmodel is based on information processing the-
ories of cognitive psychology and thus can claim a degree of cog-
nitive plausibility. No structural similarity to neural architecture
is claimed. The spatial parts of the semantic networks constitut-
ing the representations in NAVIGATOR bear some resemblance to
hippocampal representations (plots and decision points to place
cells), but are too simplistic for an actual functional correspon-
dence (e.g. not every point of the environment is represented, and
the distance metric is city-block, not Euclidean).
•Raubal (2001) describe the perceptual wayfindingmodel, a cog-
nitively based computational model for wayfinding which, unlike
NAVIGATOR, considers the information needs of navigators at each
decision point. The model is based on the ‘Sense-Plan-Act’ frame-
work, as well as affordance theory (affordances are possibilities for
action)—the idea that animals perceive the environment in terms of
what they can do with it and in it (Gibson, 1986). It is a goal-based
agent—given a current state description, goal information, and the
results of possible actions, it chooses actions to achieve a goal.
Its main components are its observation schema (containing
spatial and temporal location, goal, and measuring limitations,
in fixed frame-like structures), a wayfinding strategy (decision
rules for wayfinding), and ‘commonsense knowledge’ (including
procedural knowledge—how to move in a direction, what to do
upon reading specific symbols such as arrows on signs). The
implemented agent runs in a very simple simulated environment
which is static and discrete, having a limited number of possible
percepts and actions at each point. The agent can observe the
entire environment at any given time (unlike NAVIGATOR, which
also used static and discrete environments but accounted for
partial observability). The environment is represented as a graph
of decision points, where each node has a position and a state, and
each edge represents a transition between positions and states.
Since the evaluation scenario is set in an airport, each position has
information regarding how to reach goals (signs containing arrows
to gates). The agent first perceives the environment (senses), then
decides which action leads it toward its goal (a trivial decision
given the signs at each node), and then carries out the action (acts).
The perceptual wayfinding model is evaluated in an airport
wayfinding task (successfully finding gates), but not compared
against any human or animal data. Because of the amount of
information pre-programmed into the implemented agent, and
because of the fully observable static environment, the agent needs
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• Due to more recent improvements in computer graphics, it
has become possible to simulate virtual agents in more complex,
three-dimensional environments. In a recent model, Brom et al.
(2012) have proposed a computational model of both egocentric
and allocentric spatial memory for intelligent virtual agents (IVAs),
calling their spatial model the DP-model since it was evaluated in
a disorientation paradigm (see below). IVAs can be considered to
be embodied, although in a much simpler and more predictable
environment than the real world.
The information flow in the DP-model is as follows: sensory
systems assemble information in the ‘perception field’, based on
which egocentric representations (spatial vectors to objects in the
agent’s own reference frame) are built in the ‘egocentric subsys-
tem’, which has both an STM and LTM component. Egocentric
representations can consolidate into the LTM component of the
egocentric subsystem, as well as allocentric representations in the
long-term ‘allocentric subsystem’. Both egocentric and allocentric
representations are weighted, and weights serve as a represen-
tation of accuracy—how well a representation was learned (they
are required to model errors, since the vectors are represented
precisely, without modeling sensory inaccuracies or noise). The
agent’s perception field contains all objects in the agent’s visual
field (which is 120 wide). Eye movements, foveation, attention,
and visual recognition are not modeled; objects are represented
as state-less and static symbols. The egocentric component con-
tains the agent’s current heading (with respect to the south–north
axis), a set ofweighted egocentric vectors from the agent to objects,
and the egocentric updating configuration (containing the rates of
increasing or decreasing the weights of egocentric vectors). The
allocentric component contains a set of weighted allocentric vec-
tors between all objects, and an allocentric updating configuration
(specifying the speed of increasing weights of the allocentric vec-
tors). Egocentric vector weights are increased at every time step
if the associated object is still part of the perceptual field, and de-
creased if it is not. The vectors themselves are updated whenever
the agent moves to point correctly from the agent’s position to the
associated object. Allocentric vectors are learned from egocentric
vectors.
The agent is also endowedwith an action selectionmechanism,
enabling it to follow a specified trajectory to learn a representation
of space during the learning phase, as well as to perform pointing
tasks. In these tasks, the agent first observes and learns a number of
object locations, and subsequently has to point to these locations
after the objects have been removed. The pointing error in this task
is a function of the vector weights (themselves depending on howoften and how long the associated object has been seen during
the learning phase). An advantage of this model compared to the
previous twomodels is that it runs in amore complex (continuous,
dynamic, three-dimensional) simulated environment.
Brom et al. (2012) successfully replicate human data from two
pointing paradigm experiments previously performed using their
model, experiment 7 of Holmes and Sholl (2005), in which subjects
learned the locations of objects in a room and then had to point
to the remembered locations of the objects with their eyes closed
after a 45 rotation left or right (both in an oriented and in a
disoriented condition induced by slow rotation on a swiveling
chair), and experiment 1 of Waller and Hodgson (2006), a similar
pointing paradigm.
This model builds on theories from cognitive psychology
and produces error patterns consistent with humans in point-
ing paradigms, but does not claim structural similarity to brains.
Some tentative functional correspondence between egocentric
vectors and representations in the parietal reach region (and other
correlates of egocentric spatial memory) might be identified, since
they encode the positions of targets in an egocentric reference
frame.
3.4. Neural network-based spatial memory models
Unlike symbolic systems, neural network models usually em-
ploy non-local and distributed representations (also called sub-
symbolic representations), within interconnected networks of
simple units. NNs are simplified models of the brain composed of
a number of units (analogs of neurons) with weighted connections
between them. Mental states are represented as numeric activa-
tion values of the units (or subsets of the units), and learning is
usually implemented by modifying connection strengths between
the units (Thomas & McClelland, 2008).
There is a variety of flavors and implementations of neural net-
works, ranging from the simplest perceptrons (which sum up a
number of inputs multiplied by incoming weights and threshold
the result to yield a binary output) over the commonly used feed-
forward artificial neural networks, networks of perceptrons with-
out cycles such as feed-forward ANNs and self-organizing maps,7
7 A self-organizing map (SOM) is a typically two-dimensional neural network
learning a discretized representation (‘map’) of its N-dimensional inputs. Unlike
other ANNs, they preserve the topology of the input space. Each unit stores an N-
dimensional weight vector. During a set number of training iterations, for each
input, the nodes with weight vectors closest to the input (smallest Euclidean
distance) are ‘pulled closer ’ to the input (weight vectors are updated to be more
similar to the input)—see Kohonen (1990), or Willshaw and Von Der Malsburg
(1976) for a similar, more biologically plausible model.
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and cycles (such as attractor networks8), over neural networks
aiming tomake only biologically plausible assumptions (BNNs, ‘bi-
ological NNs’), to spiking neural networks (SNNs, which are the
most biologically realistic, and are the most computationally ex-
pensive to run; Jain, Mao, & Mohiuddin, 1996).
Of these, only the latter two (BNNs and SNNs) explicitly aim
to be biologically realistic, with this claim being extensively ver-
ified only for SNNs (they are able to account for electrophysiologi-
cal recording data from biological brains). In addition to modeling
neuronal and synaptic state, they also model temporal dynamics,
and use short and sudden increases in voltage (‘spikes’) to trans-
mit information (Ghosh-Dastidar & Adeli, 2009). BNNs, although
not directlymodeling electrophysiology, also aim to be biologically
realistic in terms of brain connectivity and their learning mecha-
nisms. We shall collectively refer to all other types of neural net-
works (the ones not aiming to closely model biological neurons)
as artificial neural networks (ANNs). ANNs, unlike BNNs and SNNs,
are usually driven by mathematical reasoning instead of biological
accuracy.
Because of the biological inspiration and the clear analogy
between units of neural networks and neurons in brains, neural
networks have been claimed to be more biologically plausible
than symbolic models. This is verifiably true for many SNNs (spike
trains, firing rates, membrane potentials etc. can be compared
with biological neurons). For ANNs, the claim of biological
realism can be cast in doubt, since they make undefended design
decisions (e.g. elements not having clear biological counterparts
such as fixed biases, nonmonotonic activation functions, or the
commonly used back-propagation learning algorithms) (Dawson
& Shamanski, 1994).
Still, even if their degree of realism is debatable, ANNs are struc-
turally more similar to brains than symbolic cognitive models—
the representations employed by both are mostly distributed,
grounded and modal Barsalou (2008). Furthermore, on a higher
level, neural network-basedmodels incorporate properties charac-
teristic of biological cognition, such as content-addressable mem-
ory, context-sensitive processing, and graceful degradation under
damageor noise Thomas andMcClelland (2008). Finally, suchmod-
els can accommodate the anatomical connections and functional
distinctions known from neuroscience in a more straightforward
fashion than symbolic models. Fig. 1 depicts anatomical connec-
tions between the spatially relevant regions described in Section 2,
and shows some example recorded firing fields of cells with spa-
tially localized firing.Most neural networkmodels reviewed below
attempt to be consistent with at least a subset of these results. For
example, all of them model place cells, except for the SOM model
by Voicu (2003). The model by Byrne et al. (2007) accounts for all
of these cell types (with a simplified anatomy).
3.4.1. Models evaluated in real-world environments
• A large number of biological ANN-based models have been
proposed based on the hippocampus and other neuroanatomical
bases of spatial memory. Burgess et al. (2000) proposed one such
model that was implemented on a Khepera robot, based on the
influential idea that place cell firing is driven by inputs with
8 A recurrently connected network of units whose time dynamics settle to a
stable pattern (e.g. a stationary point or a time-varying pattern; Eliasmith, 2007). A
type useful for spatial representations is called continuous attractor neural network
(CANN), which is able to represent a point in space by means of an activity packet
in the network centered on a specific spatial location. The activity packet stays
stationary with no inputs, but if a unit near it receives activation it moves toward
that unit—see e.g. the path integration model of Samsonovich and McNaughton
(1997).Fig. 4. Two navigation strategies. A: Allocentric navigation using a gradient ascent
strategy on a heavily interconnected network of place representations, as used by
the biological ANNmodel by Burgess et al. (2000), the ANNmodel by Schölkopf and
Mallot (1995), as well as the LIDA hybrid cognitive architecture (on a hierarchical
network). B: Egocentric navigation by always executing the action associated with
the highest reward r at each state S, learned by reinforcement learning (used in the
neural network models by Barrera et al., 2011, and Strösslin et al., 2005, as well as
in the CLARION cognitive architecture).
Gaussian responses tuned to the presence of walls at particular
distances (O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996) (later expanded and called
Boundary Vector Cell model Barry et al., 2006, which successfully
accounted for rat neural and human behavior data, but was not
implemented in a real-world robot). The model is mainly designed
to account for the place specificity of hippocampal cells and their
contribution to behavior.
It consists of a population of ‘sensory cells’, projecting to ‘en-
torhinal cells’, which map to ‘place cells’ via competitive learn-
ing, which in turn map to ‘goal cells’ by one-shot Hebbian
learning. ‘Goal cells’ also receive inputs from a reward signal and
from four ‘head-direction cells’ (north, south, east, west). Sensory
cells are a rectangular array of cells, each representing a different
possible distance and allocentric direction to a wall, just like BVCs
(Barry et al., 2006) (however, unlike BVCs, only the four orthogo-
nal compass directions are represented). Each entorhinal cell re-
ceives hard-wired connections from two sensory cells related to
two orthogonal walls. Entorhinal cells are connected to place cells,
with the connection weights being adjusted by competitive learn-
ing in order to increase the spatial specificity of place cells. Finally,
connections between place cells and goal cells are learned by one-
shot Hebbian learning—when the agent encounters a locationwith
a reward, a goal cell is excited, and the connection between it and
the corresponding place cells increased. When the rat moves away
from the reward location, the activity of these place cells will de-
crease; thus, the activation of goal cells will encode the proximity
to the reward, allowing a gradient ascent based navigation strat-
egy.
The robot running the model is able to navigate to local goals. It
is running in a single small environment without objects, and can-
not plan novel paths. However, the modeled place cell firing fields
resemble empirically observed firing fields (including changes in
their amplitude and shape when the environment is changed in
size or shape—these firing field changes are reported to be consis-
tent with experimental data).
The model is largely based on the neural basis of allocentric
spatial memory. Although the goal learning model is speculative,
both the anatomical connections and arising firing fields of the
‘place cells’ in the model are plausible, and qualitatively resemble
empirically recorded firing fields. Later extensions of the model –
which however have not been implemented on a real-world sys-
tem – include comparison to empirical data, electrophysiological
data recorded from rats as well as human behavior data (Barry
et al., 2006) (the model could successfully account for the effect
of changed environment size on both the firing fields of rat place
cells and on object locations remembered by humans).
• Another biological ANN model that is also capable of control-
ling a real-world Khepera robot was proposed by Strösslin et al.
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Unlike (Burgess et al., 2000), this model includes full visual pro-
cessing, not just distance measurements to boundaries. The model
consists of multiple interconnected populations of neurons (sub-
networks).
The ‘local view’ (LV) processes and stores visual stimuli,
and contains rotation cells and step cells. The ‘head direction
system’ (HD), corresponding to the postsubiculum, contains head-
direction cells (driven by rotation cells in LV). The ‘allothetic place
cells’ (APC) represent the agent’s position in the environment
(driven by step cells in LV). The ‘position integrator’ (PI) is a path
integration system (driven by step cells in LV). Both the APC and
PI project to the ‘combined place code’ (CPC), corresponding to
the hippocampus and subiculum. Finally, ‘action cells’ in nucleus
accumbens perform navigation learning based on place cells in
CPC. The model uses V1-inspired ensembles of units with Gabor
wavelet-like receptive fields (filters) to represent visual input in
LV. Rotation cells (RCs) in LV discriminate headings regardless
of position, based on average relative distance between stored
and current filter activity; whereas step cells (RCs) discriminate
positions – regardless of headings – based on perceived angular
differences between landmarks (firing rates of SCs depend on the
most similar column difference of the associated filters, similarly
to the ‘disparities’ in the model by Franz et al. (2008) described
above). The HD system updates head directions based on both
idiothetic cues (dead reckoning) and allothetic cues (from the
rotation cells). APC place cells are driven by multiple step cells
(connections are set by one-shot Hebbian learning), and thus their
firing is based on the current view. APC place cells help calibrate
PI cells using allothetic information to correct accumulating errors
Etienne et al. (1996). Finally, information from APC (allothetic) and
PI (idiothetic) converge in the CPC place cells.
Connections between APC and CPC are modified using Hebbian
learning. Goal-driven actions are learned in AC using Q-learning,
a variant of reinforcement learning (the ACs would correspond
to neurons in the nucleus accumbens). Each action cell encodes a
motor command, determining the allocentric direction of the next
movement.
The model is capable of learning a map in the form of a
consistent place cell code, and is able to solve navigation tasks and
learning tasks such as the Morris water-maze task.9 It cannot plan
novel routes.
9 In the Morris water-maze task, rats are placed into a pool of water in which
they have to swim. The pool contains a hidden platform. The rats search for andAlthough not using spiking dynamics, the model incorporates
insights from the neuroscience of spatial cognition known at
the time of its development, and, unlike many ANNs, does not
include neuroscientifically questionable design decisions. Further-
more, it is consistent with the neuroanatomy of the hippocampal–
entorhinal complex. Thus, it can claim a high amount of neural
plausibility. In addition to the neurally plausible models reviewed
in the next section, it also functions in the real world, with realistic
input. However, it is not evaluated against neural or behavior data.
• Barrera et al. (2011) proposed another biological ANN model
based on brain neurophysiology, which they evaluated against rat
behavior data, unlike the previously reviewed models (extending
their earlier work Barrera & Weitzenfeld, 2008). Similarly to the
model by Strösslin et al. (2005) above, they use modeled ‘place
cells’ to represent spatial locations, and use reinforcement learning
to learn appropriate reward-oriented actions at spatial locations.
Their model receives four kinds of sensory inputs: incentives
(providing the motivation/reinforcement signal), kinesthetic self-
motion information, visual landmark information (driving the
place cell representation), and affordances information (providing
possible actions to the action selection module).
These kinds of input are processed by four corresponding mod-
ules, a ‘motivation’ module (calculating a reward signal from the
incentives), a ‘path integration’ module (updating position based
on self-motion), a ‘landmarks processing’ module (representing
the current view of the animal, based on all perceived landmarks;
suggested to correspond to the EC), and an ‘affordance processing’
module (encoding possible turns the rat can perform at a given lo-
cation and orientation). The reward signal from ‘motivation’ drives
the ‘learning’ module (learning by reinforcement; corresponding
to the VTA, NA and striatum in brains), and the outputs of the path
integration and landmarks processing modules drive the ‘place
representation module’, which in turn project to the ‘action se-
lection’ module. The ‘place representation’ module includes ‘place
cells’ (PCs, the activity of which arises from aweighted linear com-
bination of the path integration and landmark inputs; correspond-
ing to the hippocampus) as well as a ‘world graph layer’ (WGL,
suggested to correspond to the prelimbic cortex). The WGL learns
a topological map by learning associations between overlapping
eventually find the platform, and remember its location in their spatial memory.
Subsequently, they immediately head for the remembered location of the platform
when placed into the pool.
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with high expected rewards associated with place cells (actor unit
weights are learned by reinforcement learning). TheWGL also per-
forms place recognition, by classifying the currently active PCs.
Finally, the action selection module computes a motor output
(the next moving displacement and direction), given the current
possible affordances, current location (place cells), and the
expectations of maximum reward from the actor units in WGL.
The model is able to learn metric (PCs) as well as topological maps
(WGL) in the place representation layer, and is able to navigate to
reward locations.
The authors evaluated their model against rat behavior data
in a simple maze navigation paradigm, in which water-deprived
rats were looking for a water dispenser, learning its location
during a number of training sessions. They used AIBO robots in
the same paradigm, in similar mazes. The robots could learn near-
accurate metric and topological maps of the mazes, and exhibited
learning curves (during learning the reward location) and numbers
of incorrect trials and optimal trials (during test trials) similar to
those of the rats.
The model is based on rat neurophysiology, and thus is neu-
ronally plausible. It is also able to function in the realworld, andhas
also been evaluated against rat behavior data (the learning curves
in a simple maze were comparable), lending credence to the au-
thors’ claim that their model can be used by experimentalists to
predict rodents’ spatial behavior, and test neuroscientific hypothe-
ses. Additionally, although not replicating neural data, the authors
present results verifying the engagement of the proposed neural
correlates of their models (reporting gene expression data) in the
rats they used in their experiments (Barrera et al., 2011).
A further neural network basedmodel ofmapping very success-
ful in robotics which was also inspired by rat neurophysiology is
RatSLAM (Milford & Wyeth, 2010). It will not be reviewed here,
since RatSLAM is not a cognitive model, and is not compared to or
intended to model either behavior or biology (the authors aim for
practical robot performance instead of plausibility).
3.4.2. Models evaluated in simulations
• Schölkopf and Mallot (1995) proposed a neural network
model of cognitive map learning in a maze, a model aiming
for cognitive rather than biological plausibility (but nevertheless
pointing out similarities to neural substrate). Their agent em-
ploys a central perception–action cycle (Fuster, 2002) (similarly
to the sense–plan–act cycle of the symbolic perceptual wayfind-
ing model; Raubal, 2001). The model assumes it is dealing with a
maze environment consisting of at least two places, with corridors
connecting the places; and also assumes a direct correspondence
between these corridors and ‘views’ (a view is thought of as being
attached to the wall opposite to the entry of the respective corri-
dor); and that views are uniquely distinguishable.
The model is based on the idea of a ‘place graph’ (an allocentric
graph of places, connected by corridors) and a ‘view graph’ (a
graph of local views connected by edges with labels representing
egocentric movements; and connected only if they can be
experienced in immediate temporal sequence). The view graph is
learned using a SOM-type (self-organizing sequence map) neural
network (Kohonen, 1990), which has three layers: an input layer
(with units representing views), a movement layer (representing
the movements left, right or back; with only one of these three
units active at each time), and a ‘map layer’. Themap layer receives
sequences as inputs, from both themovement layer (a sequence of
movements), and the view layer (a sequence of views represented
by the activity of the view layer units). A map of the current maze
is learned by ‘random exploration’, i.e. a large number of random
movements and views are passed to the network, which uses
learning by self-organization (Kohonen, 1990) to assign map unitsin a way that they closely resemble the view graph (i.e. near views
are represented by near units, and distant views by distant units).
After learning, path planning to arbitrary views can be performed
by a gradient ascent strategy (spreading activation from the goal,
and then at each map unit, progressing to the adjacent map unit
with the highest activation), a planning strategy that the authors
implemented algorithmically (not in a neural network).
Unlike the previously reviewed neural network models, this
model is able to plan novel routes algorithmically. It is also one of
only three neural networkmodels implementing topological maps
(the other two being Barrera et al., 2011 and Erdem & Hasselmo,
2012).
Since there is little direct correspondence between this model
andneuroanatomy, and since planning is implemented algorithmi-
cally, this model cannot be called biologically plausible. However,
it is argued by the authors to functionally resemble some aspects
of biological spatial memory (such as free/passive exploration and
expectations of future views).
• A model also based on self-organized learning was proposed
by Voicu (2003), extending their earlier work (Voicu & Schmajuk,
2000). Unlike the model above, it is capable of running in a full
two-dimensional metric simulation instead of a restricted maze-
like environment. A further difference is that it learns hierarchical
instead of flat spatial representations—which is frequently argued
to be the structure of cognitive maps (see Derdikman & Moser,
2010, Hirtle & Jonides, 1985 and McNamara, 1986, for behavioral
and Derdikman & Moser, 2010, for neural evidence).
The model architecture consists of a hierarchical allocentric
cognitive map and four additional modules (a localization sys-
tem providing landmark representations, a working memory for
planning paths, a motor system translating them into actions
and a control system supervising information flow between these
modules). The cognitive map itself uses types of SOM (recurrently
connected hetero-associative networks; Kohonen, 1990) to build
associations. There are three different networks representing as-
sociations between all landmarks, associations between landmarks
having the largest number of associations at the first level, and as-
sociations between landmarks having the largest number of asso-
ciations at the second level, respectively. Themap is learned in two
stages: an exploration stage for building the first level at the high-
est resolution (moving randomly at the beginning, avoiding previ-
ous places, and then, over ten acquired landmarks, moving toward
those having the fewest associations), and a second stage, building
the hierarchical cognitive map (selecting the landmarks with the
largest number of associations and associating them). Weights are
adjusted depending on distance (lower distances yielding lower
weights), so that activation gradients can serve to plan a path to-
ward a goal.
The model can learn hierarchical metric maps, and can plan
novel paths. It succeeded in reproducing the empirically observed
hierarchical cognitive maps by Hirtle and Jonides (1985), and also
produced similar distance judgment errors as humans (distances
spanning multiple clusters or submaps are overestimated both by
humans and by the model).
This model uses SOMs, types of ANNs, and does not aim to
be neurobiologically plausible. The spatial specificity of its SOM
units is also a property of hippocampal place cells, but its units
correspond to much larger areas than the observed PFs of place
cells. However, it is able to reproduce human behavior data, and
thus can make empirically validated claims for cognitive (if not
biological) plausibility.
• The map-based path integrator (MPI) model by McNaughton
et al. (1996) was an influential and still highly relevant model of
spatial representation and path integration in brains, implemented
as a SNN. It was tested and evaluated by Samsonovich and
McNaughton (1997) and later reviewed and argued to be plausible
32 T. Madl et al. / Neural Networks 65 (2015) 18–43Fig. 6. Overview of neural network models evaluated in simulated environments.Fig. 7. Overview of neural network models evaluated in simulated environments.based on neural evidence by McNaughton et al. (2006). The model
is based on ‘attractor maps’, continuous attractor networks in
which the mobility threshold for transitions between neighboring
attractors is negligibly small, as opposed to the large thresholds for
jumps between distant points (andwith global feedback inhibition
limiting total activity in the network)—this leads to activity focused
on one maximum unit and declining with distance from that unit
(i.e. an activity packet), tending tomove toward themaximal input
into the network or staying stationary in the absence of input.
The two most important modules are H, a one-dimensional
cyclic attractor map (CANN) encoding the head direction of an
agent (containing ‘HD cells’ arranged on a circle in the order
of their head-direction preference), and a P, a two-dimensional
attractor map used to encode the agent’s current position, as well
as for path integration (containing ‘place cells’ arranged in a plane,
with weights that decrease with distance). The head direction
estimate and position estimate correspond to the maxima of the
activity packets on the circular CANN and two-dimensional CANN,
respectively. To implement path integration for the HD cells, two
additional layers are required, one with units representing angular
velocity (H′), and a conjunctive layer representing both currenthead direction and velocity (R—receiving connections from H and
H′), and projecting back to the appropriate HD units. The R layer
drives the HD activity packet in the right direction whenever the
agent is turning, since R units project to the right of the currently
most active HD cell for positive angular velocity, and to the left for
negative velocity (andwith below-threshold activity if the velocity
is zero).
Similarly, path integration for ‘place cells’ in P works by
employing a number of intermediate 2D CANN layers in the I
module, each layer corresponding to a different possible head
direction (and receiving activation from that HD cell in H), with
connections that project to units in the P layer, but displaced in the
respective head direction (e.g. if the ‘north’ HD cell activates the
corresponding I layer, units of this layer would project to a place
cell that is associated with more northern locations in the P layer,
instead of equivalent units in P corresponding to the same locations
as units in I). Thus, the projection to P from the currently active I
layer (depending on the most active HD cell) can move the ‘place
cell’ activity packet in the correct direction.
Finally, HD cells and place cell firing is not only driven by
path integration, but also by associated sensory representations,
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localized place cells with sensory representations can correct
accumulating path integration errors, as well as represent stimuli
encountered in a specific location. Such sensory associations can
be learned by Hebbian learning, whereas the weights driving the
path integration mechanism (such as from H to I) which are
preconfigured and fixed.
The model is implemented as an integrate and fire SNN, and
is able to numerically reproduce several single-cell experimental
findings, such as place field stretching upon changing environment
size, dependence of place field location on the entry site, slow
rotation of place fields in disoriented rats, and learning in novel
environments; and also makes a novel prediction which was
verified experimentally after publication of the model (activity
jumps in P upon significant unexpected changes in sensory input).
However, navigation or path planning or the representation of
objects on the map is not explicitly modeled by the authors. The
model’s main strength lies in proposing the first plausible neural
network model of path integration.
The model and its elements are neuroanatomically plausible;
MEC might perform path integration (passing activation to hip-
pocampal place cells), and the analogy between modeled and bio-
logical HD cells is clear (see McNaughton et al., 2006 for evidence).
Despite the anatomical plausibility of the elements, and the com-
monuse of attractor networks tomodel head direction, it should be
noted that no empirically validatedmechanism has been proposed
yet that could result in the very specific connectivity required by
continuous attractors in brains.10 The model is implemented as a
SNN, and is thus biologically more realistic than the reviewed ANN
models. Finally, it also succeeds in reproducing and even predicting
empirical data, further substantiating its plausibility.
• Another influential model was the ‘BBB’ model proposed by
Byrne et al. (2007) and based on the BVC model (Barry et al.,
2006) (the predecessor of which was implemented on a robot,
and reviewed in the previous subsection; Burgess et al., 2000).
The model is based on the brain areas involved in allocentric
spatial representations in the medial temporal lobe, as well as
the egocentric areas in the parietal lobe (see Section 2), and thus
accounts for both kinds of reference frames.
In the model, egocentric maps are represented by a set of
neurons in a grid, each tuned to respond most strongly to an
object at a particular distance and direction from the agent’s head.
Allocentric maps are represented similarly, using neurons with
specific preferred distances and directions, with the difference
that the neurons reference direction is fixed to features of the
environment, instead of the agent’s current head direction (these
are equivalent to BVCs). The model consists of an ‘egocentric
frame’ module (representing egocentric maps, corresponding to
the precuneus), a ‘HD cells’ module representing head direction,
a ‘transformation’ module (translating between egocentric and
allocentric maps, corresponding to RSC), an ‘allocentric frame’
module (representing allocentric maps, suggested to correspond
to BVCs), a ‘place cell modules’ (representing current location
and associating sensory representations with locations), and an
‘object identity module’ (for sensory representations, with each
unit representing an object or landmark; corresponding to the
perirhinal cortex).
The network has a ‘top down’ (temporal to parietal) and a ‘bot-
tom up’ (parietal to temporal) phase, during which the allocentric
10 However, there is some empirical evidence substantiating the existence of
continuous attractors in brains (Yoon et al., 2013).
McNaughton’s continuous attractor networks are also prone to accumulating
errors, requiring external sensory input to correct them, and have distorted firing
fields at the edges of the network. Later work has improved these issues (e.g. Burak
& Fiete, 2009).map updates the egocentric one and vice versa (the information
flow in the opposite direction is blocked in each phase). Similarly
to the BVC model and its predecessors (Burgess et al., 2000), place
cell firing is driven by BVCs (the firing of which in turn depends
on the distances and directions of boundaries). The ‘transforma-
tion’ module contains N identical subpopulations, each tuned to a
specific head-direction, and connected to the egocentric map so as
to rotate it by the angle of that head direction (to translate it to a
north-oriented allocentric reference frame). At each time step, only
the subpopulation corresponding to the currently active HD cell is
active. Just like in the previousmodel, HD cell activities are updated
using CANN dynamics and angular velocity input; however, unlike
the MPI, linear path integration is not performed by the allocentric
representation. Instead, the ‘transformationmodule’ performs this
function aswell, by having an alternative set of pre-trainedweights
that result not only in the rotation but also in the translation of a
map by a constant amount (the model only accounts for constant
velocities).
The model is able to learn allocentric as well as egocentric
representations of the local space surrounding the agent in a
simulation, and is the only reviewed neural network-based model
with the ability to translate between the two. It is also able to
mentally explore representations, and to plan routes, by mentally
generating velocity signals (‘mock motor efference’) which are
decoupled from the motors. However, it cannot plan novel routes
(e.g. shortcuts/detours).
Because of the clear correspondence of model parts and brain
areas, the authors are able to simulate ‘lesions’ (by selectively
deactivating model parts or connections) and to account for lesion
studies (failure to identify landmarks in half of the egocentric
space hemispheric neglect patients; and place cell firing with HD
cell lesions). They could also model mapping, path integration,
and a paradigm in which visual and path-integrative inputs were
conflicting.
The model was implemented as a biological neural network
(with rate-coded instead of spiking neurons). Its modules and con-
nections are based on neuroscientific, and psychological evidence,
and are highly plausible. The model was further strengthened by
evaluating it in lesion study paradigms and qualitatively compar-
ing the results with human and rat data.
Most reviewed neural network models accounting for naviga-
tion make use of either place cell-like units associated with units
representing motor actions, or a gradient ascent strategy, propa-
gating activation from a goal location in a heavily interconnected
place cell-like network, and always selecting directions that in-
crease the current activation, until eventually reaching the goal.
There is no direct evidence for either of these strategies actually
being used by brains (no action representations monosynaptically
connected to place cells have been found; and except for area CA3,
place cells do not seem to be heavily interconnected—and in any
case, such activity diffusion is inherently limited in range due to
signal decay in biologically realistic networks).
• In contrast to these navigation strategies, Erdem and
Hasselmo (2012) have proposed a SNN model of navigation based
on probing linear look-ahead trajectories in several candidate
directions to find a trajectory leading to the goal location.11
This model is also based on the neural correlates of allocentric
spatial memory in the medial temporal lobe, and incorporates
hierarchical spatial representations. It incorporates four modeled
medial temporal cell types, and an additional three cell types in a
‘PFC’ module.
11 Earlier, less neurally plausible models of the same group have also used
omnidirectional probing for navigation (Gorchetchnikov & Hasselmo, 2005).
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‘head-direction cells’, ‘persistent spiking cells’, and ‘grid cells’, and
corresponding to the hippocampus, it models ‘place cells’. The
prefrontal module in turn contains ‘recency cells’, ‘topology cells’,
and ‘reward cells’ (presumably corresponding to mPFC). HD cells
are modeled to have a receptive field at a specific preferred angle
from an anchor cue (they are only driven by sensory input, not by
self-motion, unlike CANN models of HD cells). Modeled grid cell
firing is based on the persistent spiking cell model (briefly, grid
fields arise from an interference oscillation in persistent spiking
cells) (Hasselmo, 2008). Place cells are driven by grid cells in the
model, as suggested before by theoretical models (Moser et al.,
2008; Solstad et al., 2006); place fields arise from a thresholded
product of the grid fields (the multiplication is implemented using
coincidence detection in the model).
In contrast to the metric place cell map, a topological map is
created in the PFC module. Each place cell is associated with a
corresponding recency, topology, and reward cell; and topology
cells are laterally interconnected. The activity of recency cells
decays exponentially in time; their firing depends on the time
elapsed since the last visit of the associated place cell. Each time
the agent visits a place cell, the topology layer’s lateral connections
are reinforced by Hebbian learning, depending on thresholded
current activities of recency cells, with the threshold controlling
what time window is considered ‘recently visited’ and which
topological weights should be reinforced. Finally, reward cells
are also associated with place cells, and fire persistently if their
corresponding place cell marks the location of a goal or reward.
During goal-directed navigation, the agent decides on what di-
rection to choose by probing several linear look-ahead trajectory
probes with different directions starting from its current loca-
tion. Each probe engages the HD cell–persistent spiking cell–grid
cell–place cell circuit as if the agent was physically moving along
the probe trajectory. If the probe leads to the activation of a reward
cell at the goal location, associated with a place cell, the rat pro-
ceeds to move in the direction of the probe. In order to avoid the
probes missing the goal location, and to allow reaching interme-
diate goals, the reward signal is diffused in the PFC module. Thus,
secondary goals associated with place cells close to the reward cell
(and thus receiving diffused activation from it) can be navigated to
first, until the agent gets close enough to find the actual, highest-
activated reward cellwith a probe. Finally, since only directions not
obstructed by an obstacle can be probed, the agent can navigate
around obstacles (but also find a novel shortcut once an obstacle is
removed and a novel probe direction to the reward becomes pos-
sible). The model was able to produce grid cell ensemble activity
resembling recorded ratmedial entorhinal neurons demonstrating
‘look-ahead’ activity in a T-maze navigation task (Gupta, Erdem, &
Hasselmo, 2013).
The model is able to learn both metric and topological maps,
and can perform path planning on the learned maps, including
planning novel routes such as shortcuts or detours.
This model is implemented as a SNN, using biologically realis-
tic modules and connectivity; furthermore, its look-ahead mech-
anism results in activity patterns resembling data from biological
neurons.
3.5. Spatial memory models in cognitive architectures
In contrast to computational cognitive models focused on
accounting for one or few specific processes, systems-level
cognitive architectures aim to comprehensively model a wide
range of cognitive phenomena, attempting to account for behavior
and structural properties of minds (Sun, 2007). Cognitive models
of specific processes can be implemented within the framework
of a systems-level cognitive architecture. Such models also playan important role in cognitive science, providing detailed, formal
explanations, providing hypotheses, and guiding research (see
Introduction). However, the goal of being integratedwith a broadly
scoped, domain generic model – and desirability of being able
to function using the same mechanisms and internal parameters
as an agent running the same cognitive architecture in a
completely different task – sets the task ofmodelingwith cognitive
architectures apart from the task of developing cognitive models.
A large number of cognitive architectures have been proposed
(many of which deal with modeling spatial representations in
some way), too many to review here; we will aim to outline a
representative sample contributing to spatial memory modeling
instead of exhaustiveness, and only include architectures explicitly
claiming to model human or animal cognition (we omit the large
number of robotic or AI architectures uninterested in biological
cognition). More comprehensive reviews can be found in Duch,
Oentaryo, and Pasquier (2008), Goertzel, Lian, Arel, de Garis, and
Chen (2010) and Samsonovich (2010).
There is some intersection here with the previous two cate-
gories, since there are cognitive architectures that are exclusively
symbolic, exclusively neural network-based, or hybrid (combina-
tions of symbolic and neural network parts); we shall point out the
corresponding paradigm in the text, as well as in the comparison
in Table 1. To the authors knowledge, there exists no cognitive ar-
chitecture explicitly aiming to be cognitively plausible (i.e. model
humans or animals) which would account for navigation-space
spatial memory as well as being implemented on a real-world
robot in current literature. Thus we omit the ‘real-world’ category
from this section—all reviewed models run in simulations.
The popular ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought Rational)
cognitive architecture by Anderson, Matessa, and Lebiere (1997)
follows a production-rule based approach (productions consist of
sensory preconditions or ‘IF’ statements, and associated actions or
‘THEN’ statements executed when the precondition matches the
state of the world). It utilizes two types of memory: declarative
memory, encoding factual knowledge about theworld (as symbolic
entities called ‘chunks’), and procedural memory, containing
procedural knowledge in the form of productions (IF-THEN rules).
The general usefulness of these chunks and production rules is
stored in a neural network reflecting previous usage (which has
led some researchers to categorize ACT-R as a hybrid cognitive
architecture, despite it being primarily symbolic Duch et al., 2008).
Apart from memory, the central components of ACT-R are
perceptual-motor modules interfacing with the environment,
buffers, and a central pattern matcher for productions (matching,
selecting and executing production rules). This central module
is hypothesized to correspond to the basal ganglia in the brain.
ACT-R has been used to replicate a large number of psychological
experiments (Anderson et al., 2004). Although the original version
did not explicitly account for spatial cognition, it has later been
extended to include spatial memory models.
• One such extension, called ACT-R/S was proposed by Harrison
et al. (2003), adding two additional systems to ACT-R: a ‘manipu-
lative system’ (representing spatial characteristics of objects facil-
itating manipulation), and a ‘configural system’ (representing the
relative, approximate configuration of objects in space). The latter
consists of a ‘path integrator’ and a buffer containing a number of
spatial chunks called ‘configurals’, each storing an egocentric vec-
tor to an object along with its identity (ACT-R/S only includes ego-
centric representations). Objects attended to enter this configural
buffer, which holds the two or three most recent objects—when
this capacity is exceeded, the least recent chunk will be discarded
from this buffer (butwill still exist in ‘declarativememory’ for later
retrieval).
The ‘path integrator’ – instead of updating an allocentric loca-
tion representation – updates all egocentric representations in the
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feasible due to the small number of configurals activelymaintained
in the buffer). Apart fromobject identity, configurals storemultiple
vectors, to all edges of an object—in the implementedmodel,which
was two-dimensional, objects were approximated by their bound-
ing box, and four vectors were stored to the edges of that bounding
box (to the left, top, right, and bottom sides of an object). Multi-
ple configurals referring to the same object from different points
of view can be present in the model, which would have different
edge vectors but the same identity tag.
The authors implemented a food search model, which can
randomly explore an environment, try to recall a food location,
or visually search for food. The search is performed by requesting
unattended objects from the configural system, identifying it using
the visual system, and continuing the search if it is not food, or
setting it as a goal if it is. In the latter case, the agent orients itself
toward the food location, and begins another search (this time for
obstacles—any object that intersects its path to the food location).
If obstacles are found, the agent adds a subgoal to move to the left
or right of it, depending on which brings it closer to the goal. If noobstacles are left, it moves to the goal location. During navigation,
the agent repeatedly checks if it has arrived at its destination, and
also repeatedly corrects path integration errors using its visual
system (that is, if the egocentric representations updated by path
integration do not match their perceived correct location, they are
corrected).
Furthermore, it encodes ‘episodic traces’ (current contents of
the configural buffer) at each step. If visual search fails to find food,
these episodic traces can be recalled to find previously identified
food locations as well as nearby objects (after which it can per-
form another visual search for those nearby objects and navigate
to them to get closer to the food location). The authors functionally
evaluate this model of path integration and navigation, and point
out functional similarities between configural chunks and primate
spatial-view cells.
The psychological plausibility of the ACT-R model and its
parameters (buffer capacities, timings etc.) have been extensively
strengthened in a large number of different paradigms. There is
also functional similarity between the egocentric representations
in this model, and egocentric representations in the brain
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similarity between this model and neurobiology.
• Casimir by Schultheis and Barkowsky (2011) is a cognitive ar-
chitecture explicitly devised as a framework for computationally
modeling human spatial knowledge processing. Itsmain parts are a
long-term memory (LTM), working memory (WM), and a diagram
interaction component (externalizing WM representations on di-
agrams, or visually inspecting diagrams to build WM representa-
tions).
The LTM stores hierarchical, semantic network-like represen-
tations (nodes and connections between them; categories and ob-
jects as well as spatial relations are represented as nodes, whereas
connections signify associations; e.g. three nodes and two connec-
tions could represent the relation ‘Paris’-‘south of’-‘London’). The
WM can be split into three parts, one concerned with retrieving
representations from LTM based on a ‘problem representation’,
one performing memory updates of WM and LTM, and a ‘visuo-
spatial WM’ part storing and manipulating short-term representa-
tions relevant to the current problem. The problem representation
also takes the form of a semantic network, and allows the specifi-
cation of a query (such as the cardinal direction to a location, or a
distance between locations).
Retrieval from LTM works by spreading activation over the
nodes in LTM from the problem representation; the subnet
(‘fragment’) with the highest sum of activation is retrieved to the
visuo-spatial WM (retrieved subnets also have to be directly or
indirectly interlinked). This LTM structure and retrieval process
can account for some human memory phenomena. Knowledge
from different sources can enter visuo-spatial WM, including
knowledge retrieved from LTM, built by visual inspection, or
constructed from previous representations; and is represented
not symbolically but in a spatio-analogical form (i.e. there is a
structural correspondence between the representations and what
they represent in the world).
Casimir assumes that there is no strict division between spa-
tial and visual representations, but, rather, a continuum between
the extremes of simple nonmodal spatial mental models (spa-
tial) and mental images (visual). Representations are deemed
more visual with increasing numbers of relations, involved knowl-
edge types (such as distance, direction, topological knowledge),
specificity, and exemplarity (concrete exemplars or prototypes).
A ‘conversion’ process in working memory can construct and
extend representations, adding retrieved fragments if necessary,
or converting fragments to spatial mental models. An ‘exploration’
process in turn can extract spatial information from existing rep-
resentations, or infer knowledge using spatial reasoning.
Because of its emphasis on structural modeling (spatio-
analogical instead of symbolic representations), Casimir is argued
to exceed the modeling capabilities of other cognitive architec-
tures in the spatial domain (Schultheis & Barkowsky, 2011). The
architecture was tested on paradigms involving eye movements in
a spatial reasoning task (Sima, Lindner, Schultheis, & Barkowsky,
2010), mental scanning (the effect of the time to scan between en-
tities in a mental image increasing linearly with the distance be-
tween them), mental reinterpretation of spatial relations (Sima,
2011), and recall effects (Schultheis, Lile, & Barkowsky, 2007). The
model has a simple visual perception implementation facilitating
the replication of such experiments. However, navigation has not
been implemented.
The model is heavily based on prevalent cognitive science
theories of mental representations (e.g. analogical representations
Barsalou, 2008,mentalmodelsMani & Johnson-Laird, 1982,mental
images Shepard & Metzler, 1971), and replicates human behavior
data in a number of paradigms. However, it does not aim to be
biologically plausible, and its parts do not clearly correspond to
brain areas or neurons.• CLARION by Sun and Zhang (2004) is a hybrid cognitive ar-
chitecture accounting for spatial representations. It incorporates
explicit (symbolic) as well as implicit (subsymbolic) knowledge
through its four memory modules: the action-centered subsys-
tem (regulating procedural knowledge and actions), non-action-
centered subsystem (maintaining general declarative knowledge),
motivational subsystem (providing motivation for action), and
metacognitive subsystem (monitoring and directing the opera-
tions of the other subsystems).
Each module has a localist-distributed representation (explicit
knowledge) and a distributed section stored in a neural network
(implicit knowledge). Spatial representations can be acquired by
associating explicit knowledge in the form of ‘chunks’ (similarly
to ACT-R chunks—e.g. a chunk representing a reward) with the
corresponding implicit representation of sensory input.
CLARION’s ability to represent and navigate in space is shown in
the complex minefield navigation (MN) task implemented by Sun,
Merrill, and Peterson (2001). In this task, an agent has to navigate
through a two-dimensional minefield to reach a target. The agent
only has access to limited sensory information (short-range sonar
readings tomines, range and bearing gauges showing distance and
direction to the target, and the remaining time), and has to reach
the target in a limited amount of time. Only egocentric spatial
relations were used (distances and directions to nearby mines).
The agent used a type of reinforcement learning called Q-learning
(with a gradient reward depending on target distance, and a second
reward at the end depending on the agents success—depending on
how close it got to the target) to learn an optimal action policy.
The model was evaluated against human behavior data, and
produced trajectories and learning curves similar to humans in
this paradigm. It does not learn an allocentric map; rather, it uses
reinforcement learning to learn the optimal actions to reach its
goal given the obstacles in the environment. Information about the
current obstacles is represented as implicit knowledge in the ‘state’
layer of CLARION’s neural network (see Fig. 9).
Since the model uses very general modules (there is no special-
ized spatialmemorymodule), and since it consists of both symbolic
and neural network parts, it is difficult to identify structural corre-
spondences to neurobiology. CLARION has succeeded in modeling
human behavior data from a large number of paradigms – includ-
ing the above mentioned minefield navigation task – and thus can
be called cognitively plausible (Sun & Zhang, 2004).
• Another hybrid cognitive architecture is LIDA12 by Franklin,
Madl, D’Mello, and Snaider (2014), with recently developed spa-
tial capabilitiesMadl et al. (2013). Although notmodeling neurons,
LIDA is biologically inspired, with each major part of the model
functionally mapped to brain areas (Franklin et al., 2014; Goertzel
et al., 2010), and is largely based on theGlobalWorkspace Theory of
functional consciousness (Baars & Franklin, 2009; Baars, Franklin,
& Ramsoy, 2013), as well as a number of psychological and neu-
ropsychological theories including grounded cognition (Barsalou,
2008), working memory (Baddeley, 1992), and Slomans H-CogAff
cognitive framework (Sloman, 1998) among others. It is a recent
architecture and only partially implemented, but has replicated a
number of psychological experiments (Franklin et al., 2014).
LIDA’s cognitive cycles, corresponding to the action–perception
cycles in neuroscience Fuster (2002), consist of three phases. The
‘understanding’ phase includes sensing the environment, detecting
features, recognizing objects and categories, and building internal
representations. The ‘attending’ phase is responsible for deciding
12 Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent (Learning IDA), where IDA is a software
personnel agent hand-crafted for the US Navy that automates the process of finding
new billets (jobs) for sailors at the end of a tour of duty (Franklin, 2003). LIDA adds
learning to IDA and extend its architecture in many other ways.
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broadcast to the rest of the system, making it the current contents
of consciousness. This portion allows the agent to choose an
appropriate action to execute in the ‘action’ phase. During the
understanding phase, percepts are recognized based on LIDA’s
perceptual knowledge base, the Perceptual Associative Memory
(PAM), which is a connectionist structure containing nodes with
activation connected by links. Recognized objects, categories, etc.
are stored in LIDA’s preconscious ‘Working Memory’, and are
represented by structures of PAM nodes and links between them.
These PAM node structures – parts of the PAM network
– are hierarchical, modal representations similar to Barsalou’s
perceptual symbols Barsalou (2008). Since they are hierarchical
and associative, they are well-suited to represent ‘hierarchical
cognitive maps’, by associating PAM nodes representing objects
or landmarks with ‘place nodes’. Place nodes are special kinds
of PAM nodes representing a spatial location; they are arranged
in layers of two-dimensional rectangular grids with different
resolutions (distances between the place nodes). The layers
are interconnected, multiple high-resolution place nodes project
to a single low-resolution place node (with overlap); which
implements spatial clustering. This can account for systematic
position errors in humans due to hierarchical representation (Madl
et al., 2013).
LIDA agents use a gradient ascent based navigation strategy
(passing activation from a goal location through the place node
network), similarly to some of the neural network models above.
However, a significant difference is that hierarchical map repre-
sentation is used during navigation (first a rough route is planned
using the lowest resolution layer, and then successively refined
on the higher resolution layers). It can be shown that in multi-
goal navigation tasks, gradient ascent on a single map leads to a
sub-optimal nearest-neighbor strategy (as does the ‘look-ahead’
approach (Erdem & Hasselmo, 2012) and RL with simple goal-
distances as rewards (Barrera et al., 2011; Strösslin et al., 2005),
although RL with different reward functions can improve this).
Humans significantly outperform the nearest-neighbor strategy in
multi-goal paradigms such as the traveling salesperson problem13
(TSP), planning near-optimal routes. The gradient ascent strategy
on a hierarchical cognitive map in LIDA significantly improves
route optimality, without sacrificing the biological plausibility of
a connectionist map for a symbolic planning mechanism.
LIDA-based agents have been shown to be able to perform
mapping and navigation, and model human behavior in different
tasks, including modeling map recall errors, capacity limits of
spatial working memory, and errors in the TSP paradigm (Madl
et al., 2013) (work is underway to embody LIDA on a robot
(Franklin et al., 2014) and to extend it with both egocentric and
allocentric real-world spatial memory). Although not a biological
neural network, spatialmemory in LIDA is connectionist; and there
is similarity between ‘place nodes’ and hippocampal place cells
(also accounting for hierarchies in an empirically substantiated
fashion, unlike most other models).
3.6. Comparative table
Table 1 shows a comparison of the reviewed models, charac-
terizing them according to the criteria outlined in Section 3. It
compares the level of modeling by stating the elemental position
representation for each model, as well as the reference frames or
types of representations accounted for, the learning mechanism,
13 The traveling salesperson problem requires planning the shortest route visiting
each location among a fixed number of locations exactly once, and then returning
to the starting location.the structural similarity between models and underlying neural
mechanisms, and the complexity of the environments and types of
tasks inwhich themodels have been evaluated (to help assess their
generality and complexity). Quantitative ‘goodness of fit’ was not
included because most models did not perform quantitative sta-
tistical evaluations against data; and the exceptions that did used
different tasks.
4. Discussion
Direct comparison of the reviewed models is made difficult by
their very different goals and paradigms. Although computational
cognitive models should be evaluated quantitatively as well as
qualitatively, the majority of the reviewed models were not
quantitatively evaluated against actual behavior data. Exceptions
include:
• (Symbolic—Brom et al., 2012): replication of human accuracies
in pointing tasks (subjects/agent had to remember locations of
several objects in a room, and subsequently asked to point to
the locations after the objects have been removed)
• (Neural network-based—Barry et al., 2006; Burgess et al., 2000):
This model is the only reviewed model which was compared
to both electrophysiological data from rat place cells, and
behavioral data human subjects. It could successfully account
for the effects of changed environment size on both place fields
and on remembered locations of objects.
• (Neural network-based—Barrera et al., 2011): The model’s
learning curve when learning to reach a goal in a maze was
comparable to that of rats in an experiment
• (Neural network-based—Voicu, 2003): The model imposed
hierarchies comparable to human hierarchical cognitive maps,
and resulted in comparable distance estimation biases
• (Cognitive architecture-based—Schultheis & Barkowsky, 2011):
Replication of eye movements in spatial reasoning, mental
scanning,mental reinterpretation of spatial relations, and recall
effects
• (Cognitive architecture-based—Sun&Zhang, 2004): Replication
of human data in a minefield navigation task
• (Cognitive architecture-based—Madl et al., 2013): Replication
of human performance in the traveling salesman problem and
of map representation errors
Apart from psychological plausibility in terms of comparable
behavior, the functional advantages of the models are also impor-
tant aspects. Although all models represent spatial information in
some form, there is a large difference in terms of the complexity of
the environments they can handle, the accuracy of these represen-
tations, and the range of tasks they can be used for.
It should be noted that although all of these models can be
said to create maps (of different kinds and different accuracies),
only a few of them can be said to be modeling ‘cognitive maps’
in the sense of Tolman (1948), who has pointed out that cognitive
maps can be used to plan novel routes such as shortcuts or detours
(for known routes, no allocentric map would be necessary). In this
sense, only 7models are accounting for cognitivemaps—those that
can perform path planning (see also the ‘Abilities’ row in Figs. 2–
9): Beeson et al. (2010), Byrne et al. (2007), Erdem and Hasselmo
(2012), Gopal and Smith (1990), Madl et al. (2013), Schölkopf and
Mallot (1995) and Voicu (2003).
In general, models capable of handling a higher environmental
complexity in Table 1 should be regarded as functionally more
powerful. Models capable of running in the real world face greater
challenges and are more difficult to implement than simulated
models, since they need to cope with noise and errors both in their
sensory input andmotor output, as well as with the usually greater
complexity and unpredictability of real environments.
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surroundings in the same reference frame, and loop closing, i.e. the
problem of recognizing a place the agent has seen before (and
correcting representation errors), are particularly difficult tasks in
the real world. The main reason for this is that different places can
look very similar (perceptual aliasing), and the same place can also
look different at various times in dynamic environments. Only two
of the reviewed models are able to perform both global mapping
and loop closing in the real world (Beeson et al., 2010; Jefferies
et al., 2008).
Looking at the structural similarities (which roughly translate
to biological plausibility) and the environmental complexities in
the table, it can be seen that in most cases there is a tradeoff
between the two. Models with high biological realism (SNNs, e.g.
McNaughton et al., 1996; or Erdem & Hasselmo, 2012) usually
have trouble handling highly complex real-world environments
(due mainly to their high computational demands, but also to the
observation that it is easier to model high-level cognitive tasks
such as planning with simpler – such as symbolic – models). In
contrast, models built to work well on real-world robots (such
as HSSH) usually cannot be called biologically realistic, and also
have difficulties fitting human behavior data (due mainly to the
abstractions and methodological shortcuts employed to quickly
develop efficient algorithms that can tackle complex input, and
also due to computational restrictions of robots).
It is very difficult to implement and run a model that incorpo-
rates both high psychological and biological plausibility and the
ability to handle real-world environments. The model by Barrera
et al. (2011) is notable because although it cannot close the loop
and cannot perform globalmapping, it can learn a real-worldmaze
with a learning curve similar to rats, using a model that is highly
structurally similar to rat brains.
The line of research attempting to implement real-world ca-
pable cognitive models can be expected to yield important in-
sights in the cognitive sciences. First, because of the desirability
of realistic input and output for accurate models of biological cog-
nition (sticking to overly simplistic environments causes similar
difficulties for a mechanistic understanding of cognition as study-
ing sphericalwooden balls or the solar systemmodelwould for nu-
clear physicists). Second, robotics and machine learning research
has already provided significant insights and facilitated break-
throughs in cognitive neuroscience, and there is reason to believe
it will continue to do so. Examples are the development of statisti-
cal methods to deal with sensory uncertainty (which later proved
to help explain behavioral and neural data, starting the ‘Bayesian
brain’ movement; Knill & Pouget, 2004), machine learning ap-
proaches for learning optimal action policies in unpredictable en-
vironments (reinforcement learning, which has contributed to
understanding the neuroscientific study of conditioning; Maia,
2009), or dynamical systems and control theory (which have in-
spired dynamical systems approaches to cognition; Beer, 2000).
4.1. Open questions
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of the reviewed
models incorporate allocentric representations (every reviewed
real-world capable model does), and that a majority of the models
capable of handling large-scale real-world environments represent
both metric and topological spatial maps. The first point – the
importance of allocentric spatial representations –has been known
to cognitive science for many decades (Tolman, 1948). However,
surprisingly little psychology and neuroscience research effort
has been invested in identifying the mechanisms involved in
topologicalmapping (for example, there is still nowell-established
neural correlate of topological maps in the brain—see Section 2;furthermore, the computational mechanism of how humansmight
partition space into topological maps is not well understood).
Models incorporating topological spatial representations such
as the ones reviewed above might provide inspiration and insight
for such research (unfortunately, none of themempirically validate
theirmodelwith regard to topologicalmapping). Using empirically
verified computational cognitive models to try out hypotheses
regarding topological representation or the topology building
mechanism in humans or animals would be an interesting and
mostly unexplored line of research.
Along similar lines, it has long been suspected that the
‘cognitive map’ might be hierarchical (Derdikman & Moser, 2010;
Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; McNamara, 1986), and multiple models
incorporate hierarchies in their maps (such as HSSH, the model
by Voicu, 2003, LIDA, and Casimir). Plausible neural correlates of
hierarchical maps have also been identified in hippocampal and
entorhinal cortical neurons with significantly varying firing field
sizes (Derdikman &Moser, 2010). However, themechanismwhich
humans or animals use to cluster spatial representations into
maps and sub-maps and organize them into a hierarchy is not yet
understood (it is likely that the simple distance-based clustering
mechanisms employed by most existing hierarchical models are
insufficient to explain the error patterns caused by hierarchical
maps; for example, perceptual or functional similarity almost
certainly play a role in the mechanism organizing landmarks
hierarchically in brains).
A further not fully understood part of spatial memory is
the transformation process converting between egocentric and
allocentric representations. Some of the reviewed models include
both types of representations (Beeson et al., 2010; Brom et al.,
2012; Byrne et al., 2007; Franz et al., 2008; Schultheis &
Barkowsky, 2011). However, none of these models have evaluated
their transformation mechanism against empirical data, with the
exception of the neural network model by Byrne et al. (2007)
(which seems to predict heavily coordinated and correlated
activity in the neural correlates of transformation, i.e. the RSC; but
such activity has been not observed).
A question that has yielded significant progress – but still
no mature models explaining empirical data – regards the
identification of ‘landmarks’ (how does the perceptual system
identify landmarks, using them for orientation, as opposed to
navigationally irrelevant stimuli?). Factors such as distance,
stability, uniqueness, perceptual salience, and functional relevance
seem toplay a role. However,most existing spatialmemorymodels
either focus on localizing and navigating based on geometry, or
are tested in sparse environments where a strategy of using every
encountered object as a landmark is viable.
Finally, progress in the field of modeling spatial memory
could be made by integrating the insights of individual models
accounting for various phenomena (egocentric/allocentric, met-
ric/topological, local/global, associative/reinforcement learning,
geometric/landmark based, etc.) and tasks within the samemodel.
Both the task of integrating these disparate processes, and evalu-
ating them in a large number of tasks and settings, could yield new
insights. Cognitive architectures would be in a uniquely suitable
position to incorporate such an integration due to their generality
and pre-existing non-spatial cognitive mechanisms.
4.2. Methods for verifying the biological plausibility of cognitive
spatial memory models
The overview of Section 3 has outlined a number of qualitative
and quantitative ways to evaluate computational models. In this
section, we shall focus on describing recent methods for judging
the biological plausibility of a model. Apart from qualitative
evaluations of structural similarity to the underlying neurobiology
T. Madl et al. / Neural Networks 65 (2015) 18–43 41(such as the similarities in Table 1), it is also possible to empirically
validate biological plausibility by comparing model predictions
with neuroscientific data.
For biologically realistic neural network models, the most
straightforward way of empirical verification is comparison
with in-vivo electrophysiological single-unit recordings (in which
microelectrodes are used to measure the action potentials of
individual neurons in the brain of a live animal performing a task,
preferably the same task in a similar environment as that of the
model). For ANNs, a mapping function can be designed converting
their numeric activation value to a spike rate; in the case of SNNs,
the comparison is straightforward (spike trains or even voltage
traces can be compared). The BVC model (Barry et al., 2006) is an
example computational model successfully predicting the firing
activity of spatially relevant neurons in single-unit recordings.
However, formostmodels, this is not viable;most often because
they do not contain representations analogous to single biological
neurons. In this case, higher-level brain-imaging data can be used
for evaluation, which shows the time-dependent activity of brain
areas involved in performing a task. Most frequently employed
examples are fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging, a
technique with high spatial but low temporal resolution) and
EEG (electroencephalography, with low spatial but high temporal
resolution). For models whose modules have been mapped to
brain areas, it is possible to convert the activity of model parts
into predicted brain area activations, and thus compare the model
with neuroscientific data. Since the mapping function is arbitrary
and does not place structural requirements on the underlying
model, this procedure is possible even for models with little or no
biological realism.
The ACT-R cognitive architecture is an example model that
has used this approach successfully. ACT-R’s major modules have
been mapped to brain areas (such as the imaginal module to the
posterior parietal region, or the central pattern matcher to the
basal ganglia), and a suitable mapping function has been devised
that converts activity in these modules into activation patterns
resembling fMRI data (Qin et al., 2007), andmore recently, EEGdata
(Motomura, Ojima, & Zhong, 2009), successfully predicting brain
activity in novel circumstances (Anderson et al., 2008).
5. Conclusion
Having briefly summarized the basis of spatial memory in
brains, we then reviewed a number of computational cognitive
models of spatial memory, and presented a comparative table to
help overview the major modeling directions taken within this
large and highly fragmented topic. Although focusing on models
concerned with human or spatial cognition, we have attempted
to bring the fields of cognitive science, robotics, and neuroscience
closer together by highlighting sources of overlap and interaction,
and the modeling approaches most closely matched to each. We
have pointed out what robotics and neuroscience can contribute
to the field of cognitive modeling, and proposed some novel
potential mappings between parts of existing models and relevant
brain areas, in the hope of facilitating understanding, comparison,
and evaluation. We have also outlined some open questions in
the field, and how current (and future) models could address
these questions. Computational cognitive modeling has much to
offer spatial memory research (and cognitive science research in
general), verifying existing hypotheses, yielding new ones, and
guiding research.
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